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Abstract
We study the problem of demand response contracts in electricity markets by quantifying the impact of considering
a mean–field of consumers, whose consumption is impacted by a common noise. We formulate the problem as a
Principal–Agent problem with moral hazard in which the Principal – she – is an electricity producer who observes
continuously the consumption of a continuum of risk–averse consumers, and designs contracts in order to reduce her
production costs. More precisely, the producer incentivises the consumers to reduce the average and the volatility
of their consumption in different usages, without observing the efforts they make. We prove that the producer can
benefit from considering the mean–field of consumers by indexing contracts on the consumption of one Agent and
aggregate consumption statistics from the distribution of the entire population of consumers. In the case of linear
energy valuation, we provide closed–form expression for this new type of optimal contracts that maximises the utility
of the producer. In most cases, we show that this new type of contracts allows the Principal to choose the risks she
wants to bear, and to reduce the problem at hand to an uncorrelated one.
Key words: Electricity markets, demand response models, moral hazard, mean field games with common noise,
McKean–Vlasov controlled SDEs.
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1 Introduction
Consumption management, in particular energy efficiency and demand response, is undeniably one of the most impor-
tant challenge in the energy sector, all the more since it is one of the basis to guarantee the fulfilment of EU objectives
in terms of green energy and emission reduction. Indeed, on the one hand, electric energy cannot easily be stored, which
is why utilities have always tried to directly match supply and demand by limiting the production rate of their power
plants, by commissioning or decommissioning generators, or by importing electricity from other utilities. However,
what can be achieved on the supply side is limited: some production units can take a long time to reach full capacity,
some units can be very expensive to operate, or demand can sometimes exceed the capacity of all the available power
plants combined. Demand response seeks to adjust electricity demand rather than supply. On the other hand, the
business–as–usual criticism of renewable energy is based on a presumed inadequacy with regard to demand. In fact,
adequacy could be addressed: the variability of renewable energy production could be monitored through consumption
management. The development of smart meters, for example, is a big step in this direction, but the quality of their
usage will be crucial. In addition, optimised energy tariffs could allow a better sharing of risks between producers and
consumers. This is where most of the potential improvement in energy consumption lies.
Demand response is a change in the energy consumption of an electricity utility consumer to better match demand with
supply. Utilities can report demand requests to their customers in a variety of ways, including contracts under which
the consumer normally receives electricity at a lower price than the standard rate in exchange for significantly higher
prices at certain peak periods chosen by the generator. The customer can then adjust his consumption by postponing
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tasks that are costly in terms of electricity, or by paying a high price. Many experiments have been developed to
accurately assess the benefits of demand response programs on consumption, see the references in [1] for more details.
Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi [1] focus in particular on the large scale demand response experiment of Low Carbon London
Pricing Trial. Nevertheless, demand response mechanisms face challenges which have to be tackled before one can claim
that they provide a level of flexibility comparable to thermal power plants. In particular, demand response programs
exhibit a substantial variance in the response of the consumer to price signal. This leads to uncertainty on the total
response of the solicited population. This large variance, called the responsiveness effect, is a significant gap in demand
response programs.
In this perspective, Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi formulate in [1] the mechanism of demand response programs as a
continuous–time Principal–Agent problem with moral hazard. The Agent – He – is a risk–averse CARA consumer
who has a baseline consumption of electricity, calibrated in view of his lifestyle (his preferences, the size and thermal
insulation of his housing,...) and the electricity price. He can deviate from his original demand, by reducing both
the average level of his consumption and its volatility if he has incentives to do it. The reduction of the consumption
volatility can also be seen as an increase of consumer’s responsiveness. His efforts are costly, and may depend on the
nature of the corresponding usage of electricity (heating or air conditioning, lightning, television, washing machine,
computers...). The Principal – She – is a risk–averse CARA producer who has to satisfy the random electricity demand
of the consumer. She is subject to energy generation costs, and also to consumption volatility costs, which account
for the limited flexibility of electricity production. As always in contracting theory, she wants to find an optimal way
to encourage the Agent to reduce the mean and the volatility of his consumption, in order to minimise the costs she
faces. However, in moral hazard framework, she cannot offer a compensation directly related to his effort, because she
cannot observe it, and she only observes his deviation consumption in continuous–time. Thanks to the recent works
of Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi [11, 12], the optimal contract in this framework consists in a deterministic payment
that depends on the duration of the demand response, a linear payment on each infinitesimal deviation, and a linear
payment on the realised squared volatility. The main results of this model are that optimal contracting allows the
system to bear more risk as the resulting volatility may increase, and that the control of the consumption volatility
can lead to a significant increase of responsiveness.
In this paper, we extend the framework defined in [1] to a model with a mean–field of correlated Agents. Until now,
continuous–time Principal–Agent models with many agents were restricted to drift control, see Élie and Possamaï [17],
Koo, Shim and Sung [24], or Goukasian and Wan [18] for a finite number of interacting Agents, or Élie, Mastrolia and
Possamaï [16], and more recently Carmona and Wang [9] for a mean–field of uncorrelated Agents.1 The first motivation
behind our extension is that it seems more realistic that the producer does not consider the agents one by one, but
wants to optimise the consumption in mean for a large pool of similar and correlated consumers. Therefore, we consider
that each consumer can deviate from his baseline consumption, and each consumption is subject to a common noise,
which accounts for the common random environment where all the consumers evolve. In regard to energy, this common
random environment can for instance be interpreted as consequences of meteorological variations. Hence, the problem
of the producer is to manage a pool of similar consumers, whose consumption is subject to the same climate hazards.
The second motivation is that considering a mean–field of consumers can be profitable for the producer, as she has
access to more information by observing all consumption profiles. Apart from the mean–field aspect and the correlation
between Agents through the common noise, the problem formulation is voluntarily as close as possible to that of [1],
and is developed in Section 2.
We work under a classical mean–field framework, where all agents are identical: all consumers have the same character-
istics, the same costs, the same risk–aversion parameter. This assumption is justified for a major electricity producer
or provider, who has a sufficiently large number of similar consumers. It allows us to restrict the analysis to a represen-
tative Agent, who is a single consumer identical to others, and too small to have an impact on the global consumption.
Moreover, this framework prevents us from indexing the compensation of a consumer on a particular consumption
profile, except his own. This is indeed the case in the energy sector: the General Data Protection Regulation specifies
that the Energy Distribution Organising Authorities (EDOA), the licensing authorities, have only the right to access
aggregated (and therefore anonymous) data on electricity production and consumption in a given territory2. Moreover,
1There was a much larger number of attempts in static or discrete–time settings, but always with finitely many agents. We refer the
reader to the most notable works in this direction, among which we can find Holmström [22], Mookherjee [27], Green and Stokey [19],
Harris, Kriebel and Raviv [21], Nalebuff and Stiglitz [28], Demski and Sappington [14], Itoh [23], Rey-Biel [34], Bartling and von Siemens
[2], Grund and Sliwka [20], Demougin, Fluet and Helm [13] as well as Neilson and Stowe [29] or Kragl [25].
2Decree No. 2017-948 of 10 May 2017 on the procedures for making electricity and gas consumption data available to consumers and
Decree No. 2017-976 of 10 May 2017 on the procedures for consumers to access electricity or natural gas consumption data and for suppliers
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in France, a report3 stipulates that a provider or social landlord may use a person’s consumption data to compile
statistics, if the data are anonymous or aggregated and therefore do not allow the identification of a physical person.
The goal of this paper is thus to find a way for the Principal to benefit from dealing with a mean–field of correlated
consumers during a fixed finite period. The idea we develop is to add a component in the contract proposed by the
Principal to an Agent. In usual Principal–Agent models as in [1, 11, 12], classical contracts for drift and volatility
control consist in two parts:
piq one is indexed on the process controlled by the Agent, to incentivise him to make an effort on the average of his
process;
piiq the second is indexed on the quadratic variation of the process controlled by the Agent, and incentivises him to
make an effort on the volatility of his process.
In our framework and taking into account the development of smart–meters, the Principal has access to a large
quantity of anonymous consumption profiles. Therefore, she can compute empirical statistics from these data points.
In particular, she can approximate the conditional law, with respect to the common noise, of the deviation consumption
of the pool of consumers she manages. Indeed, this law is the limit of the empirical distribution of N´Agent’s deviation
consumption, and is conditional because of the correlation of the consumption by the common noise. Hence, she can
for instance design a new contract in order to penalise a consumer who makes less effort, on average, than the rest of
the pool, or to reward him if he makes more effort. The corresponding penalisation/reward is paid at a future time
fixed in the contract. This approach is motivated by the recent development of applications that make it now possible
to compare one’s own consumption with that of similar households, or even with the lowest consuming households4.
Moreover, results of the study [15] by Dolan and Metcalfe on energy efficiency have shown that comparing energy usage
with similar households or providing financial incentives can lead to an average reduction in household energy usage
of 7%. They found on the one hand that the communication of the average consumption incentivises people to reduce
their own consumption, and on the other hand that financial compensations are an efficient way to reduce consumption.
Towards this objective, we study a new class of contracts, adding to the classic contract for drift and volatility control,
a component indexing the contract on the law of the deviation consumption of other consumers. Section 3 is devoted to
the intuition leading to this new type of contracts and the formal proofs are reported in Appendix A. This section also
investigates the representative consumer’s optimal response to the proposed contract as well as the resulting mean–field
equilibrium between consumers.
The resolution of the producer’s problem is discussed in Section 4. Based on the results of Section 3, the Principal’s
problem is reduced to a McKean–Vlasov problem, because she impacts through the contract, and so somehow indirectly
controls, the efforts of the Agents as well as the conditional law of the consumption deviation of the Agents. The intuition
for the Principal’s problem in this mean–field framework comes from the N´Agents case. Following the reasoning of
Élie, Mastrolia and Possamaï in [16], without common noise and for CARA utility function, the Principal becomes
risk–neutral in the limit when N ÝÑ `8, by classical propagation of chaos arguments. However, in our framework,
with common noise, the consumption deviations of the Agents become asymptotically independent, conditionally to
the common noise. Therefore, a risk–averse Principal does not become risk–neutral in our case, and remains impacted
by the residual risk arising from the common noise. Nevertheless, in addition to the case of a risk–averse Principal, we
will study the case where her risk–aversion tends to zero, i.e. the case of a risk–neutral Principal. The study of the
first–best case, when there is no moral hazard and thus the Principal can directly choose the efforts of the consumers,
is reported to Appendix 6.2.
The main point of this work is to prove that the new contracts we developed are more profitable than the traditional
ones. Section 5 is devoted to this comparison, by implementing classical contracts in our framework. In order to
have closed–form solutions, we focus on a particular case: the linear energy value discrepancy case. The energy value
discrepancy is the difference between a consumer’s preference toward his deviation consumption and the production
costs of this deviation. If this difference is positive, this means that the energy is more valuable for the consumer than
it is costly for the producer. Conversely, if the difference is negative, a decrease in consumption will have less negative
effects on a consumer’s welfare than positive effects on the producer’s savings. If this difference is linear with respect
to make such data available.
3Pack de conformité pour les Compteurs communicants [Compliance package for communicating meters], Commission Nationale de
l’Informatique et des Libertés [National Commission for Information Technology and Liberties].
4see for example the phone application EDF & Moi by the french electricity producer and provider Electricité de France, or the website
of Synergy, an Australian producer and provider.
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to the deviation consumption, it is easy to show that the utility of the producer is increased by the use of our new
contracts. Moreover, in most cases, these new contracts induce more efforts from the consumers to reduce the average
level of their consumption and with less volatility. More precisely, by using the values of the parameters calibrated in
[1], we can see an increase:
• in the utility of the Principal up to 20%;
• in the effort to reduce the average consumption up to 45%;
• in the variance responsiveness up to 4%;
depending on the correlation with the common noise. Moreover, the greater the variance explained by the common
noise, the more significant the results are. Therefore, these new contracts could improve demand response during
periods where consumption is strongly affected by weather conditions, for example in winter, when the risk of electricity
blackouts is high, and thus demand response is more than needed.
Throughout this work, we consider a Principal who can not observe the common noise, or at least that there exist some
regulatory rules preventing her from using the common noise directly in the contract. This hypothesis is relatively
well established in the field of energy consumption. Although some electricity suppliers offer different prices depending
on the day or time of consumption (peak–period, off–peak period...), called time-variant pricing5, these tariff offers
correspond more to an indirect indexation on the weather through the spot price of electricity. We find that the
indexation of the contract on others is another way to indirectly index the contract on weather. Indeed, it allows the
Principal to divide the deviation consumption in two parts: the part actually controlled by the Agent, corresponding to
the deviation corrected for climate hazards, and the common noise. Hence, she can offer a compensation indexed on the
really controlled deviation to encourage the Agent for making effort on the drift and the volatility. If she is risk–averse,
she can add to this contract a part indexed on others, which is in fact an indexation on the common noise, to share the
remaining risk, even if regulatory rules prevent her from using the common noise directly in the contract. Therefore,
in the case where the Principal is allowed to index the contract on the common noise, we obtain the same form of
contracts. We can conclude that contracting on the conditional law or on the common noise is strictly equivalent.
These results are explained in Section 6.1.
In addition to the practical contributions of our model, we develop along the way new technical results. As explained
in [11, 12], moral hazard problems in continuous–time in which the Agent controls the volatility of the output are
notoriously harder to study. As such, and as far as we know, our model is the first one which combines a multi–agent
setting (actually an infinite number of agents in mean–field interaction), with both drift and volatility controlled.
Moreover and unlike in [16], or [9], we also consider a setting with common noise. Though natural to model electricity
consumers, the common noise induces a wide range of additional mathematical difficulties, which have only been recently
addressed, see [8], albeit only for pure mean–field games, without an additional Stackelberg on top, as in our setting.
In particular, and again unlike in [16] or [9], the simplifying class of contracts we derive in Section 3 cannot be proved
almost by definition to be without loss of generality, and we need to use generalised notions of mean–field second–order
BSDEs to obtain this fundamental result. Moreover, we emphasise that even though we work with a specific model, the
modus operandi we develop in this paper can readily be extended to general moral hazard problems with mean–field
agents and common noise. This is one of the reasons why we have made specific efforts to ensure that all our statements
and definitions are completely mathematically rigorous, in particular the definition of the weak formulation for mean–
field games with common noise and optimal control problems of McKean–Vlasov stochastic differential equations, as
these two tools are the fundamental cornerstones of our approach. We believe that this will prove useful for other
applications and generalisations of our techniques.
In summary, this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides the class of optimal
contracts, and solves the representative consumer’s problem, as well as the mean–field equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted
to solve the Principal’s problem under moral hazard with the new contracts. Section 5 allows the comparison of utilities
and efforts with the case where only classical contracts are offered to the consumers. Section 6.1 provides the results
when the contracts can be indexed directly on the common noise, and we investigate in Section 6.2 the first–best
problem, as a benchmark in which the Principal can directly monitor the efforts of the Agents. Section 7 concludes.
Notations: Throughout this paper, T ą 0 denotes some maturity fixed in the contract. We set d a positive inte-
ger representing the number of different usages of electricity. Let N‹ :“ Nzt0u. Throughout this paper, for every
5see for example the proposal of the Environmental Defense Fund in https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/time-variant_
pricing_fact_sheet_-_april_2015.pdf
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d´dimensional vector b with d P N‹, we denote by b1, . . . , bp its coordinates, for any 1 ď i ď d. Let 0d and 1d be the
vectors of size d whose coordinates are all equal to respectively 0 and 1. For any p`, cq P N‹ˆN‹, we identify R`ˆc with
the space of `ˆ c matrices with real entries. Elements of the matrix M P R`ˆc will be denoted by pM i,jq1ďiď`, 1ďjďc,
and the transpose of M will be denoted by MJ P Rcˆ`. For any positive integer n and for pα, βq P Rn ˆ Rn we also
denote by α ¨ β the usual inner product, with associated norm }¨} when there is no ambiguity on the dimension n
considered.
2 Problem formulation
2.1 Informal description
For any positive integer n, let Cpr0, T s,Rnq denote the set of continuous functions from r0, T s to Rn. On Cpr0, T s,Rnq,
define the evaluation mappings pit by pitpxq “ xt and the truncated supremum norms } ¨ }t by
}x}t “ sup
sPr0,ts
}xs}, for t P r0, T s.
Unless otherwise stated, Cpr0, T s,Rnq is endowed with the norm } ¨ }T . For t P r0, T s, we denote by PtpRnq :“
PpCpr0, ts,Rnqq the set of all probability measures on Cpr0, ts,Rnq. For µ P PT pRnq, let µt P PtpRnq denote the
image of µ under pi¨^t. For p ě 0 and a separable metric space pE, `q, let PppEq denote the set of µ P PpEq withş
E
`ppx, x˝qµpdxq ă `8 for some (and thus for any) x˝ P E. For p ě 1 and µ, ν P PppEq, let `E,p denote the
p´Wasserstein distance, given by
`E,ppµ, νq :“ inf
"ˆż
EˆE
`ppx, yqγpdx, dyq
˙1{p
: γ P PpE ˆ Eq has marginals µ, ν
*
.
Unless otherwise stated, the space PppEq is equipped with the metric `E,p, and PpEq has the topology of weak
convergence. Both are equipped with the corresponding Borel σ´fields, which coincides with the σ´field generated by
the mappings µ P PppEq (resp. PpEq) ÝÑ µpF q, F being any Borel subset of E.
We work under a classical mean–field framework, where all agents are identical: all consumers have the same char-
acteristics, the same costs, the same risk–aversion parameter... We thus restrict our study to a representative Agent,
who is a single consumer, identical to a pool of others, and too small to impact the global consumption. In order to
properly define the mathematical set up of our problem, we need a process representing the deviation consumption
of the representative Agent, driven by an idiosyncratic noise for each usage (d´dimensional) and a common noise
(1´dimensional). The Agent controls this process by choosing a pair ν :“ pα, βq, where α and β are respectively A´
and B´valued, see below for the definition of A and B. We denote for simplicity U :“ A ˆ B. More specifically,
α represents the effort of the consumer to reduce the nominal level of consumption and β is the effort to reduce the
variability of his consumption for each usage of electricity. We emphasise that α and β are d´dimensional vectors, thus
capturing the differentiation between different usages, e.g. refrigerator, heating or air conditioning, lightning, television,
washing machine, computers... The set of admissible efforts, denoted by U “ A ˆ B, will be defined rigorously in the
next subsection. We also define a vector σ P p0,`8qd representing the variability of the Agent’s consumption when he
does not make any effort, and a constant σ˝ P R` representing the correlation with the common noise. Therefore, for
a chosen control ν “ pα, βq P U , the Agent’s control process can be written informally, for any t P r0, T s, as
Xt “ x0 ´
ż t
0
αs ¨ 1dds`
ż t
0
σpβsq ¨ dWs `
ż t
0
σ˝dWs˝ , with σpbq :“ pσ1
?
b1, . . . , σd
?
bdqJ, b P p0, 1sd. (2.1)
The state variable X represents the consumer’s deviation from the deterministic profile of his consumption. An effort
ν induces a separable cost cpνq :“ 12cαpαq ` 12cβpβq. We use the same specification of the cost function c for the
representative consumer as in [1]:
cαpaq :“
dÿ
k“1
pakq2
ρk
and cβpbq :“
dÿ
k“1
pσkq2
λkηk
´
pbkq´ηk ´ 1
¯
, a P A, b P B,
for fixed pρ, λ, ηq P p0,`8qd ˆ p0,`8qd ˆ p1,`8qd. The cost of the effort in the drift term of X, denoted by cα, is a
classical quadratic cost function, meaning that no effort for the Agent induces no intrinsic cost, and such that he has
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no interest to provide negative efforts. The cost associated with the effort in the volatility of X prohibits the Agent
from removing the volatility (bk ą 0) and is equal to zero if the Agent makes no effort (case bk “ 1).
For technical reasons, we need to consider bounded efforts, we then set
A :“ r0, ρ1Amaxs ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ r0, ρdAmaxs and B :“ rBmin, 1sd,
for some constants Amax ą 0 and Bmin P p0, 1q. Note that since X is a deviation from a baseline consumption, the
upper bound for the drift control is coherent, since the agent cannot consume a negative amount of electricity.
2.2 Theoretical formulation
To be consistent with the weak formulation of control problems, we let U be the collection of all finite and positive
Borel measures on r0, T s ˆ U , whose projection on r0, T s is the Lebesgue measure. In other words, every q P U can be
disintegrated as qpds,dvq “ qspdvqds, for an appropriate Borel measurable kernel qs. The weak formulation requires
to consider a subset of U, namely the set U0 of all q P U such that the kernel qs is of the form δφspdvq for some Borel
function φ, where as usual, δφs is the Dirac mass at φs.
In order to combine the theoretical formulations of mean–field games and McKean–Vlasov problems, we are led to
consider the following canonical space
Ω :“ Ω˝ ˆ Ω1 ˆ Ω2 ˆ U,
where Ω˝ :“ Cpr0, T s,Rq, Ω1 :“ Cpr0, T s,Rˆ Rdq, and Ω2 :“ PT pRq,
with canonical process pW ˝, X,W, µ,Λq, where for any pt, w˝, x, w, u, qq P r0, T s ˆ Ω,
Wt˝ pw˝, x, w, u, qq :“ w˝ptq, Xtpw˝, x, w, u, qq :“ xptq, Wtpw˝, x, w, u, qq :“ wptq,
µtpw˝, x, w, u, qq :“ uptq, Λtpw˝, x, w, u, qq :“ q.
Less formally, X represents the deviation consumption controlled by the representative consumer, affected by an
idiosyncratic noise W and a common noise W ˝. The process µ allows to keep track of the law of X conditionally to
the common noise and the space U corresponds to the controls. The canonical filtration F :“ pFtqtPr0,T s is defined as
Ft :“ σ
´`
Ws˝ , Xs,Ws, µs,∆spϕq
˘
: ps, ϕq P r0, ts ˆ Cb
`r0, T s ˆ U,R˘¯, t P r0, T s,
where Cbpr0, T s ˆ U,Rq is the set of all bounded continuous functions from r0, T s ˆ U to R, and for any ps, ϕq P
r0, T s ˆ Cbpr0, T s ˆ U,Rq, ∆spϕq :“
şs
0
ş
U
ϕpr, vqΛpdr, dvq. We will also need a smaller filtration containing only the
information generated by the common noise and the conditional law of X. Namely, we define F˝ :“ pFt˝ qtPr0,T s by
Ft˝ :“ σ
`pWs˝ , µsq : s P r0, ts˘, t P r0, T s.
Remark 2.1. The restriction to the filtration F˝ stems from the presence of common noise in our model. As pointed
out by Carmona, Delarue and Lacker [8], it is commonplace for control problems in weak formulation, and actually
already for weak solutions to SDEs, that the underlying driving noise is not rich enough to obtain a solution which is
only adapted to it. In our context, this translates into the fact that in general the law of X may fail to be measurable only
with respect to the information generated by the common noise W ˝, which justifies the enlargement in the definition
of F˝. This is linked to the so–called compatibility condition in the MFG theory with common noise, which intuitively
means that a given player in the game does have access to the full information generated by the idiosyncratic and
common noises W and W ˝, as well as the distribution of all other players’ states, and his controls are allowed to
be randomised externally to these observations, but such a randomisation must be conditionally independent of future
information given current information.
Let C2b pRˆ Rd ˆ R,Rq be the set of bounded twice continuously differentiable functions from Rˆ Rd ˆ R to R, whose
first and second derivatives are also bounded, and for any ps, ϕq P r0, T s ˆ C2b pRˆ Rd ˆ R,Rq, we set
Mspϕq :“ ϕpXs,Ws,Ws˝ q ´
ż s
0
ż
U
ˆ
Apvq ¨∇ϕpXr,Wr,Wr˝ q ` 12Tr
“
D2ϕpXr,Wr,Wr˝ qBpvqBJpvq
‰˙
Λpdr, dvq,
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where D2ϕ denotes the Hessian matrix of ϕ, A and B are respectively the drift vector and the diffusion matrix of the
vector process pX,W,W ˝qJ
Apvq :“
¨˝´a ¨ 1d
0d
0
‚˛, Bpvq :“
¨˝
0 σJpbq σ˝
0d Id 0d
0 0Jd 1
‚˛, v :“ pa, bq P U.
Therefore, the covariation matrix of the vector process pX,W,W ˝qJ is defined for all v P U by
BpvqBJpvq “
¨˝
Σpbq ` `σ˝˘2 σJpbq σ˝
σpbq Id 0d
σ˝ 0Jd 1
‚˛,
where Σpbq :“ σJpbqσpbq for all b P B. We fix some initial conditions, namely a probability measure % on R representing
the law at 0 of X. We then let M be the set of all probability measures on pΩ,FT q and define then the subset P ĂM
of all P such that
piq Mpϕq is a pP,Fq´local martingale on r0, T s for all ϕ P C2b pRˆ Rd ˆ R,Rq;
piiq P ˝ pX0q´1 “ %, and there exists a measure ι on Rd ˆ R such that P ˝
`pW0,W0˝ q˘´1 “ ι;
piiiq P“Λ P U0s “ 1;
pivq for P´a.e. ω P Ω and for every t P r0, T s, we have µtpωq “ Pωt ˝ pXt^¨q´1, where pPωt qωPΩ is a family of regular
conditional probability distribution6 (r.c.p.d) for P given Ft˝ . We will denote by Eµtpωq the expectation under the
distribution µtpωq. For ease of notation, we will often omit the ω in the notation for the expectation;
pvq pW ˝, µq is P´independent of W .
The previous formulation does not give us access directly to the dynamics of the consumption deviation X. It is
however a classical result that, enlarging the canonical space if necessary, one can construct Brownian motions allowing
to write rigorously the dynamics (2.1), see for instance [36, Theorem 4.5.2]. It turns out here that since we enlarged
the canonical space right from the start to account for the idiosyncratic and common noises, any further enlargement
is not required.
Lemma 2.2. For all P P P, Λpds,dvq “ δνPs pdvqds P´a.s., for some F´predictable control process νP :“
`
αP, βP
˘
and
Xt “ X0 ´
ż t
0
αPs ¨ 1dds`
ż t
0
σpβPs q ¨ dWs `
ż t
0
σ˝dWs˝ , t P r0, T s, P´ a.s..
Notice that using classical results of Bichteler [5] (see [30, Proposition 6.6] for a modern presentation), we can define
pathwise version of the quadratic variation of xXy and xX,W y, both being F´predictable, allowing us to define the
following R`´valued process
St :“ limsup
nÑ`8
n
`xXyt ´ xXyt´1{n˘.
In order to apply the chain rule with common noise, as defined in [7, Theorem 4.17], we will need a copy of the process
X, denoted by rX, driven by the same common noise W ˝, and with the same conditional law µ. For this purpose, we
need to define a copy of the initial canonical space.
Definition 2.3 (Copy of a space). Let Ω be a canonical space of the form Ω :“ Ω˝ ˆ Ω1 ˆ Ω2 ˆ U. A copy of Ω is
defined by rΩ :“ Ω˝ ˆ rΩ1 ˆ Ω2 ˆ rU where rΩ1 and rU are respectively standard copies of the spaces Ω1 and U.
6We recall that these objects are such that for any ω P Ω, Pωt is a probability measure on pΩ,Fq, such that for any A P F , the map
ω ÞÝÑ Pωt rAs is Ft˝ ´measurable, and such that for any P´integrable random variable ξ on pΩ,Fq, we have
EPrξ|Ft˝ spωq “ EP
ω
t rξs, for P´a.e. ω P Ω.
Notice that since pΩ,Fq is a Polish space and Ft˝ is countably generated, the existence of these r.c.p.d. is guaranteed for instance by [10,
Theorems 2.6.5 and 2.6.7].
7
This canonical space rΩ is supporting a canonical process `W ˝, rX,ĂW,µ, rΛ˘, and the canonical filtration rF :“ p rFtqtPr0,T s
is defined exactly as F. We let rM be the set of all probability measures on `rΩ, rFT ˘. We can then define the subsetrP Ă rM as we defined P ĂM. Hence, for any rP P rP, we can write
rXt “ rX0 ´ ż t
0
α
rP
s ¨ 1dds`
ż t
0
σpβrPs q ¨ dĂWs ` ż t
0
σ˝dWs˝ , t P r0, T s. (2.2)
where, rP´a.s., rΛpds,dvq “ δνrPs pdvqds for some rF´predictable control process νrP :“ `αrP, βrP˘.
Definition 2.4 (Copy of a process). The process rX defined above by (2.2) is called a copy of X.
As before, the notation rEµt will stand for the expectation under µt on the space `rΩ, rF˘. Similarly, we can define
another canonical space pΩ by pΩ “ Ω˝ ˆ pΩ1 ˆ pΩ2 ˆ pU. This alternative probability space allows us to model the
deviation consumption of other consumers, affected by the same common noise W ˝. This canonical space is supporting
a canonical process
`
W ˝, pX,xW, pµ, pΛ˘, and the canonical filtration pF :“ p pFtqtPr0,T s is defined as F and rF. We let pM be
the set of all probability measures on ppΩ, pFT q, we can then define the subset pP Ă pM in the same way we define P ĂM.
Hence, for any pP P pP, we can write
pXt “ pX0 ´ ż t
0
α
pP
s ¨ 1dds`
ż t
0
σpβpPs q ¨ dxWs ` ż t
0
σ˝dWs˝ , t P r0, T s.
where, pP´a.s., pΛpds,dvq “ δνpPs pdvqds for some pF´predictable control process νpP :“ `αpP, βpP˘. The notation pEpµt will
stand for the expectation under pµt on the space ppΩ, pFq. Copies of the deviation consumption of others, denoted by qX,
are defined in the same way as copies rX of X by Definition 2.4, on the space qΩ :“ Ω˝ ˆ qΩ1 ˆ pΩ2 ˆ qU, itself a copy ofpΩ in the sense of Definition 2.3. This space is supporting a canonical process and the associated canonical filtrationqF :“ p qFtqtPr0,T s. The notation qEpµt stands for the expectation under pµt on the space pqΩ, qFq. Notice that for the sake of
consistency, notations involving r¨ (resp. p¨ and q¨) will always refer to copies of the initial space Ω (resp. the canonical
space for others pΩ and a copy pΩ).
In order to compute the associated salary, the Agent is going to assume that the others have played some distributionpµ, defined as the conditional law of pX under some fix pP on the copy of the space, and he is going to compute ξ along
his own deviation X and pµ.
2.3 Definition of a contract
In the work [1], the Principal – an energy producer – offers a contract to an Agent – a consumer – indexed on his
deviation consumption. In our investigation, the Principal faces a mean–field of Agents and can therefore benefit
from this additional information: she can offer contracts depending on both the deviation of a given consumer, and
the aggregate statistics of the deviation of other consumers. This form of contract allows the Principal to index the
compensation of a consumer on his deviation, but also on the efforts of other consumers, through the distribution of
their deviations.
In the framework we are interested in, the electricity producer is not allowed to reveal the consumption of a particular
consumer to another consumer. Hence, she cannot directly design a remuneration for a consumer with respect to the
deviation consumption of another dedicated one. This is why we consider aggregated statistics in this case. We insist
on the fact that it is a legal requirement for electricity producers to respect the privacy of their consumers, even when
they have access to their consumption profile through modern smart–meters. Moreover, in accordance with the mean–
field framework, the Principal is facing a mass of identical and indistinguishable consumers, and thus can not choose a
deviation consumption of another consumer to contract on it. Formally, the Principal proposes to the representative
Agent a contract ξ which is a random variable measurable with respect to the natural filtration generated by both X,pµ, denoted Fobs, recalling that:
• X is the deviation consumption of the representative Agent,
• pµ is the law of the deviation consumption of other Agents, conditionally to the common noise.
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In other words, ξ must be a measurable functional of the paths of X and pµ:
ξ : Cpr0, T s,Rq ˆ PT pRq ÝÑ R,
pX, pµq ÞÝÑ ξpX, pµq. (2.3)
Remark 2.5. Considering the conditional law pµ naturally comes from the limit of the N´Agents case. Indeed, if the
Principal monitors N consumers, she wants to index the contract for the i–th consumer on his own deviation Xi and
on the empirical distribution of other consumers, µ´i, defined as:
µ´i :“
ˆ
1
N ´ 1
Nÿ
j“1,j‰i
δXjt
˙
tě0
where the deviations Xj are not independent since all consumers are suffering from the common noise W ˝. Hence, in
the mean–field framework, we may wonder about the convergence of the empirical measure µ´it as N tends to 8. In
the absence of the common noise, the standard theory of propagation of chaos applies: asymptotically, particles become
independent and the µ´it converges to their common asymptotic distribution. By contrast, when there is a common
noise, even in the limit N ÝÑ 8, the particles must still keep track of the common noise W ˝, so they cannot become
independent. Nevertheless, it has been proved in [7] that particles become asymptotically independent conditionally on
the common noise, and that the empirical distribution converges towards the common conditional distribution of each
particle given the common noise (pµ in our case).
Given this contract, and the conditional law of the deviation consumption of other consumers pµ, the representative
consumer solves the following optimisation problem
V A0
`
ξ, pµ˘ :“ sup
PPP
JA0 pξ, pµ,Pq, where JA0 pξ, pµ,Pq :“ EP„UAˆξpX, pµq ´ ż T
0
`
c
`
νPt
˘´ f`Xt˘˘dt˙, (2.4)
where c : Rd` ˆ p0, 1sd ÝÑ R` is the cost function associated with the effort ν made by the Agent, and the function
f : R ÝÑ R denotes the preference of the Agent toward his deviation consumption. The function f is required to
be concave, increasing, and centred at the origin. This means that the reduction of the Agent’s consumption causes
him discomfort, and conversely, if the consumption deviation is non-negative, the agent consumes more electricity,
which gives him satisfaction. Closed–form solutions will be obtained for linear f . The function UA is an exponential
utility function, with risk aversion parameter of the representative consumer RA ą 0, defined by UApxq “ ´e´RAx.
In addition, the producer is not allowed to offer any contract satisfying (2.5). We assume that consumers have an
endogenous reservation utility R0 ă 0, below which they refuse the contract offered by the producer. The underlying
idea is that without compensation (that is for ξ “ 0), a consumer could already exert efforts and modify his consumption,
and thus receive utility R0. They would, of course, refuse any contract which does not provide them with at least what
they could get by themselves. We refer to Appendix B for more details on how to compute the value of R0.
In fact and for technical reasons, we restrict our attention to contracts ξ such that there exists some p ą 1 with
sup
PPP
EP
”
epRA|ξ|
ı
ă `8, and (CARA), (2.5)
where (CARA) is a technical assumption given below by (4.7) only necessary in order to solve the problem of a CARA
risk averse Principal (and useless to solve the Agent problem). These technical assumptions are always satisfied in the
application to linear energy value discrepancy (see Section 4.2). The corresponding class of contracts satisfying (2.5)
and the participation constraint is denoted by Ξ.
Finally, notice here that the contracts offered by the Principal have been assumed to not be indexed on the common
noise W ˝. This can either mean that the Principal cannot observe it perfectly, or that there are regulatory reasons
preventing the producer from using it directly in the contract. However, our formulation allows to incorporate the case
where this becomes possible. Thus, in Section 6.1, we will study the case where the Principal is allowed to use the
common noise directly in the contract. In this particular case, she can offer to the representative Agent a contract ξ,
measurable with respect to the natural filtration generated by X, W ˝ and pµ, denoted by Fobs,˝. In other words, ξ must
be in this case a measurable functional of the paths of X, W ˝ and pµ:
ξ : Cpr0, T s,Rq ˆ Cpr0, T s,Rq ˆ PT pRq ÝÑ R,`
X,W ˝, pµ˘ ÞÝÑ ξpX,W ˝, pµq. (2.6)
The corresponding class of contracts will be denoted by Ξ˝.
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2.4 Definition of a mean–field equilibrium
We work under a classical mean–field framework, where all agents are identical. Hence, similarly to [8], we define a
mean–field equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2.6 (Mean–field equilibrium). Let ξ P Ξ be a contract. A mean–field equilibrium is a pair `P‹, µ‹˘ P
P ˆ PT pRq such that
piq Given µ‹ P PT pRq, the probability P‹ P P is optimal for (2.4), i.e.
V A0 pξ, µ‹q “ EP
‹
„
UA
ˆ
ξpX,µ‹q ´
ż T
0
`
c
`
νP
‹
t
˘´ f`Xt˘˘dt˙.
piiq For P‹´a.e. ω P Ω and for every t P r0, T s, we need to have
µ‹t pωq “ Pωt ˝ pXt^¨q´1,
where pPωt qωPΩ is a family of regular conditional probability distribution for P‹ given Ft˝ .
We denote by M‹pξq the collection of all such mean–field equilibria. We extend readily this definition to contracts in
Ξ˝, and denote byM‹,˝pξq the associated set of mean–field equilibria.
Less formally, a mean–field equilibrium is characterised by:
piq a probability law P‹ of a process X‹, which is the optimal deviation consumption of each Agent;
piiq the conditional law µ‹ of X‹ with respect to the common noise.
2.5 The Producer
We now turn to the problem of the Principal. In the one Agent framework defined in [1], the Principal has an exponential
utility function, with risk–aversion parameter RP ą 0, defined by UP pxq “ ´e´RP x and wants to minimise:
piq the compensation paid to the Agent: ξ.
piiq the cost of production, corresponding to additional costs induced by the deviation consumption: gpXtq, where g
is concave and increasing. It means that if the Agent’s deviation consumption is positive, the consumption has
increased, hence the Principal has an additive cost of production. Conversely, a negative deviation consumption
means that the consumption is decreasing, hence the Principal benefits from a decrease of production costs.
piiiq the quadratic variation of the deviation consumption: xXyt. This penalisation term allows the Principal to take
into account the variations of consumption over time. This additional cost is particularly relevant in electricity
markets, since the Producer has to follow the load curve, and the higher the volatility of the consumption, the
more costly it is.
The intuition for the Principal problem in the mean–field case comes from the N´Agents case. Formally, if we consider
a N´players model, the Principal would minimise the (utility of the) sum of the previous costs. To ensure stability
of these sums as N grows, and therefore obtain a mean–field limit of the N´Agents problem, we can follow the line
of [16] by assuming that each individual deviation consumption is scaled by the total number of Agents N . In their
framework, without common noise and also with exponential utility functions, the Principal becomes risk–neutral in
the limit when N ÝÑ `8, by classical propagation of chaos arguments. Another interpretation of the risk–neutrality
of the Principal in this case is that the Principal is diversifying the risk by considering a large number of consumers:
the random average penalised output in the N´players’ game converges to a deterministic quantity. In our framework,
with common noise, as explained in Remark 2.5, the consumption deviations of the Agents become asymptotically
independent, conditionally to the common noise. Therefore, a risk–averse Principal does not become risk–neutral in
our case, and remains impacted by the residual risk arising from the common noise. Nevertheless, we will consider both
cases of a risk–averse and a risk–neutral Principal.
As a consequence, similarly to [16] and [1], given a contract ξ, the performance criterion of the Principal is defined for
any P P P by
JP0 pξ,Pq :“ EP
„
UP
ˆ
´ EP
„
ξ `
ż T
0
gpXsqds` θ2
ż T
0
dxXys
ˇˇˇˇ
FT˝
˙
,
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where the function UP : R ÝÑ R is the Principal’s utility function and θ is a positive constant representing the costs
induced by the quadratic variation of the consumption, accounting for the limited flexibility of production.
Anticipating the results we obtain in Section 3, for a contract ξ P Ξ, any mean–field equilibrium pP‹, µ‹q P M‹pξq
will give the same utility to the consumers, since they all have the same characteristics. Furthermore, in the absence
of limited liability in our model (compensations ξ need not be non–negative), the participation constraints of the
consumers is going to be saturated, meaning that any optimal contract will provide them exactly their reservation
utility level. Therefore, in the case where an optimal contract would lead to several possible equilibria, the consumers
will be indifferent to the specific one chosen, implying that we can reasonably assume, as in the standard moral hazard
literature, that the Principal can maximise her utility by choosing the optimal equilibrium for her. This leads to the
following second best contracting problem
V P0 :“ sup
ξPΞ
sup
pP,µqPM‹pξq
JP0 pξ,Pq,
with the usual convention sup∅ “ ´8. Notice that for the contracts in the class we will end up considering, there is
only one possible equilibrium, which makes the above issue not really central to our analysis.
In the moral hazard contracting problem considered here, the Principal has an interest in giving a contract for which
there is at least a mean–field equilibrium, otherwise, by convention, her utility is equal to ´8. Thus, contracts ξ P Ξ
such thatM‹pξq “ ∅ will never be offered by the Principal, meaning that we can implicitly assume that there always
will be an optimal response from the consumers to a contract proposed by the Principal. Moreover, since the contract
has to satisfy the participation constraint, there exists pP‹, µ‹q PM‹pξq such that V A0 pξ, µ‹q ě R0. The set Ξ of eligible
contracts is now formally defined. We define similarly Ξ˝ and V P,˝0 .
The study of the first–best contracting problem, i.e. when the Principal can observe in continuous time the efforts of
the Agents, and thus can also index the contract on them, is reported in Section 6.2.
3 Agent’s problem
We consider for now that the Principal only observes X and pµ. From (2.3), we recall that the Principal is offering a
contract Fobs´measurable. For a given distribution of states for the other players pµ, we consider the dynamic version
of the value function of the representative consumer, V At , which satisfies V A0 “ V A0 pξ, pµq, and V AT “ UApξpX, pµqq. From
this definition, we notice that the following explicit relationship between the payoff and the terminal value function
holds
ξpX, pµq “ ´ 1
RA
ln
`´V AT ˘ . (3.1)
In this section, we will start, for a given contract and given efforts chosen by other consumers, by introducing the
appropriate Hamiltonian functional, which will allow to first compute formally the optimal response of the consumer.
Intuitively, this Hamiltonian appears by applying the chain rule with common noise defined [7, Theorem 4.17] to the
dynamic value function of the consumer and considering the associated Master equation. Our next step is then to derive
a class of so–called revealing contracts, thus extending to a general mean–field game framework the main arguments of
[12], which considered general moral hazard problems with one agent, and [16], which considered mean–field game moral
hazard problems where the agents controlled only the drift of the output process X. Informally, the class of revealing
contract is obtained by still using the chain rule with common noise, but applying it to a transformed function of the
consumer’s dynamic value function, defined by (3.1). The analysis, though informal at this point (it will rigorously be
justified later in the paper, mainly in Appendix A) relies strongly on recent progresses on the dynamic programming
approach to the control of McKean–Vlasov SDEs. Finally, considering revealing contracts allows us to calculate the
optimal efforts of the representative Agent and the associated mean-field equilibrium. We will see in the following
section (see Theorem 4.1) that the restriction to revealing contracts is in fact without loss of generality.
3.1 Consumer’s Hamiltonian
Intuitively, we expect that the continuation utility V At of the consumer, given a contract ξ P Ξ and efforts of other
consumers subsumed by the distribution pµ, may be written as
V At “ vA
`
t,Xt^¨, pµt˘,
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that is, the process V A at time t depends on t, on the path history of X and on the conditional law pµ of deviation
consumption of others. Indeed, the contract being only indexed on X and pµ, should not depend on all the information
contained on F and pF. Denote for simplicity, for any positive integer n, by Ln the set of Borel measurable functionals
from Cpr0, T s,Rnq into R, and L :“ L1.
We denote by pν :“ `pα, pβ˘ the effort of other consumers, defined on ppΩ, pFT q. For any ζ :“ pz, zµ, γ, γµ,1, γµ,2, γµq P
Rˆ Lˆ Rˆ Lˆ L2 ˆ L, we define the function h on Rˆ PT pRq ˆ Rˆ Lˆ Rˆ Lˆ L2 ˆ Lˆ U2 by
h
`
x, pµ, ζ, pν, v˘ :“´ za ¨ 1d ´ pEpµt“zµ` pXt^¨˘pαt ¨ 1d‰` 12γ´Σpbq ` `σ˝˘2¯` 12 pEpµt”γµ,1` pXt^¨˘´Σ`pβt˘` `σ˝˘2¯ı
` 12
`
σ˝
˘2pEpµtqEpµt“γµ,2` pXt^¨, qXt^¨˘‰` `σ˝˘2pEpµt“γµ` pXt^¨˘‰´ cpa, bq ` f`x˘,
where qX is a copy of pX in the sense of Definition 2.4.
In the Markovian framework, if the value function is smooth enough in the sense of [7, Section 4.3.4], in view of the
chain rule with common noise for function of both the state and the measure (see [7, Theorem 4.17]), we are naturally
led to consider the following HJB equation, also called Master equation in the literature, see for instance [7, Section
4.4.2]
”´ BtvApt, x, pµq `RAvApt, x, pµqH`x, pµ, ζ, pν˘ “ 0”, where H`x, pµ, ζ, pν˘ :“ sup
vPU
h
`
x, pµ, ζ, pν, v˘, (3.2)
and
ζ “ ´ 1
RAvA
pBxvApt, x, pµq, BµvApt, x, pµq, B2xvApt, x, pµq, BvBµvApt, x, pµq, B2µvApt, x, pµq, BxBµvApt, x, pµqq.
We refer to [7, Section 4.3.4] for a rigorous definition of derivatives with respect to a measure. The Hamiltonian of the
representative consumer is then defined on Rˆ PT pRq ˆ Rˆ Lˆ Rˆ Lˆ L2 ˆ Lˆ U as
Hpx, pµ, ζ, pνq :“ 12Hdpzq ` 12Hvpγq `Hcpx, γq `H˝ppµ, ζ, pνq, (3.3)
where
Hdpzq :“´ inf
aPA
 
2za ¨ 1d ` cαpaq
(
, Hvpγq :“ ´ inf
bPB
 
cβpbq ´ γΣpbq
(
, Hcpx, γq :“ 12γpσ
˝q2 ` fpxq,
H˝ppµ, ζ, pνq :“´ pEpµt“zµ` pXt^¨˘pα ¨ 1d‰` pσ˝q2pEpµt“γµ` pXt^¨˘‰` 12 pEpµt“γµ,1` pXt^¨˘`Σppβq ` pσ˝q2˘‰
` 12
pEpµtqEpµt“γµ,2` pXt^¨, qXt^¨˘pσ˝q2‰.
Therefore, the Hamiltonian of the representative consumer consists of four parts. The first three, Hd, Hv and Hc,
are the classical parts for drift and volatility control, which do not depend on the efforts and the distribution of other
players’ states. The last part, H˝, does depend on the law and the efforts of others, and act as a constant part for the
representative consumer, since he cannot control it. Note that the optimisers are given by
ak,‹pzq :“ ρkpz´ ^Amaxq and bk,‹pγq :“ 1^
`
λkγ´
˘ ´1
ηk`1 _Bmin, for k “ 1, . . . , d. (3.4)
3.2 Toward a relevant form of contract
One of the cornerstones of the approach to continuous–time moral hazard problems pioneered by Sannikov [35], and
studied in full generality in [12], is to obtain an appropriate probabilistic representation for incentive–compatible
contracts. The goal of this section is to use formal dynamic programming type arguments to deduce such a representation
in a context where a mean–field of agents is involved, each of them being able to control the volatility of the output
process, and to then prove that mean–field equilibria are easily accessible for this class of contracts.
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3.2.1 Informal derivation
In view of (3.1), we expect that a contract Fobs´measurable is any terminal value of the following process, as a function
of t, the path of X up to t, and pµt, the conditional law of pXt^¨:
ξt :“ ´ 1
RA
lnp´V At q “ upt,Xt^¨, pµtq, where u :“ ´ 1RA lnp´¨q ˝ vA.
Assuming that we can apply to the function u : r0, T s ˆ R ˆ PT pRq ÝÑ R the chain rule with common noise under
C1,2,2´regularity, defined in [7, Theorem 4.17], we obtain
upt,Xt^¨, pµtq “ up0, X0, pµ0q ` ż t
0
Btups,Xs^¨, pµsqds` ż t
0
Bxups,Xs^¨, pµsqdXs ` ż t
0
pEpµs“Bµups,Xs^¨, pµsqp pXs^¨qd pXs‰
` 12
ż t
0
B2xups,Xs^¨, pµsqdxXys ` 12
ż t
0
pEpµs“BvBµups,Xs^¨, pµsqp pXs^¨qdx pXys‰
` 12
ż t
0
pEpµsqEpµs“B2µups,Xs^¨, pµsq` pXs^¨, qXs^¨˘d@ pX, qXDs‰` ż t
0
pEpµs“BxBµups,Xs^¨, pµsqp pXs^¨qd@X, pXDs‰.
By computing the partial derivatives of u in terms of the partial derivatives of vA, and using the HJB equation satisfied
by vA, see (3.2), as well as the corresponding notations, we obtain after some tedious but simple computations that
the contract should be parametrised by
`
Z,Zµ,Γ
˘
, and satisfies
ξt “ ξ0 ´
ż t
0
HpXs, pµs, ζs, pαsqds` ż t
0
ZsdXs `
ż t
0
pEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘d pXs‰` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RAZ2s
˘
dxXys
` 12RA
ż t
0
pEpµsqEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘Zµs ` qXs^¨˘d@ pX, qXDs‰`RA ż t
0
ZspEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘d@X, pXDs‰, (3.5)
where for px, pµ, ζ, pαq P Rˆ PT pRq ˆ Rˆ Lˆ Rˆ Lˆ L2 ˆ LˆA
Hpx, pµ, ζ, pαq :“ 12Hdpzq ` 12Hvpγq `Hcpx, γq ´ pEpµ“zµpα ¨ 1d‰. (3.6)
The HamiltonianH defined by (3.6) is a simplified version of the Hamiltonian defined by the equation (3.3) in Subsection
3.1. In fact, some parts of the Hamiltonian which are not controlled by the consumer simplify with some parts of the
contract. Therefore, the triple pγµ,1, γµ,2, γµq P L ˆ L2 ˆ L no longer appears and, abusing notations slightly, ζ will,
from now on, exclusively refer to a triple pz, zµ, γq P Rˆ Lˆ R and is called the triple of payment rates.
Though the expression (3.5) is appealing to be used as our generic contract form, it is not possible to use it directly in
the context of a Principal–Agent problem with moral hazard. In fact, this form depends explicitly on the drift’s effort of
other consumers, namely pα, through the Hamiltonian, and this effort is not supposed to be observable, nor contractible
upon, for the Principal. Nevertheless, we can overcome this difficulty by replacing pα by the optimal drift process of
other consumers, which has to be formally computed as the maximiser in the Hamiltonian denoted by pα‹ and defined
by (3.4) so that pak,‹ppzq :“ ρkppz´ ^ Amaxq, k “ 1, . . . , d, where pz is the payment rate for the other consumers’ drift
effort. Indeed, at equilibrium, each consumer should consume optimally. Moreover, in our mean–field framework, the
consumers are identical and indistinguishable. Therefore, the Principal will offer the same contract for all agents, that
is the payment rate for drift effort will be the same for all the consumers, since no discrimination is allowed. Hence,
the optimal drift process of other consumers will be pα‹pZq.
Definition 3.1 (Simple contracts). For any R ˆ L ˆ R´valued Fobs´predictable process ζ :“ pZ,Zµ,Γq, and any
ξ0 P R, let us define the following process
ξξ0,ζt :“ ξ0 ´
ż t
0
HpXs, pµs, ζs, pα‹sqds` ż t
0
ZsdXs ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RAZ2s
˘
dxXys `
ż t
0
pEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘d pXs‰
` 12RA
ż t
0
pEpµsqEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘Zµs ` qXs^¨˘d@ pX, qXDs‰`RA ż t
0
ZspEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘d@X, pXDs‰, t P r0, T s, (3.7)
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where the function H is defined by Equation (3.6). We let then V be the set of R ˆ L ˆ R´valued Fobs´predictable
process ζ such that
sup
PPP
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
epRA|ξ
ξ0,ζ
t |

ă `8,
where p is the same as in Condition (2.5). We call random variables of the form pξξ0,ζT q, for pξ0, ζq P R ˆ V, simple
contracts, and denote the corresponding set by ΞS. Moreover, for any R ˆ L ˆ R´valued F´predictable process ζ :“
pZ,Zµ,Γq, we will denote by ζ “ pZ,Zµ,Γq the R3´valued F´predictable process, with Zµt “ pEpµtrZµt p pXt^¨qs, for
t P r0, T s. We will say that ζ P V if ζ P V.
Remark 3.2. Notice that the integrability requirement in the definition of the set V is rather implicit. It is however
clear that V is not empty as it contains trivially constant processes, since the drift and the volatility of X are always
bounded. Besides, this is exactly the integrability we need to be able to solve the MFG for the agents given a contract
in ΞS, as the proof of Theorem 3.4 below will make clear.
3.2.2 Interpretation of the form of contracts
This contract is mainly composed of two parts: one is an indexation on the process controlled by the consumer, that is
to say his deviation consumption, the other one is an indexation on other consumers through the law pµ. In particular,
similarly to [1], the contract has a linear part in the level of consumption deviation X and the corresponding quadratic
variation xXy, with linearity coefficients Z and Γ. This part of the contract is the classic contract for drift and volatility
control. The constant part is slightly different from the usual one in the moral hazard framework. In fact, we can
divide it into three integrals:ż T
0
HpXs, pµs, ζs, pα‹sqds “ ż T
0
ˆ
1
2HdpZsq `
1
2HvpΓsq ` fpXsq
˙
ds´
ż T
0
pEpµs“Zµs p pXs^¨qpα‹s ¨ 1d‰ds` 12`σ˝˘2
ż T
0
Γsds.
(3.8)
The first one represents the certainty equivalent of the utility gain of the consumer that can be achieved by an optimal
response to the contract, and is thus subtracted from the Principal’s payment, in agreement with usual Principal–Agent
moral hazard type of contracts. Moreover, due to the risk–aversion of the consumer, the infinitesimal payment ZtdXt
must be compensated by the additional payment 12RAZ2t dxXyt. Following the same reasoning, the second integral in
(3.8) and the additional payment
1
2RA
`
σ˝
˘2 ż t
0
`pEpµs“Zµs p pXs^¨q‰˘2ds,
in (3.7) are compensations for the infinitesimal payment pEpµs“Zµs p pXs^¨qd pXs‰ indexed on others, and the last integral is
a compensation for the covariation induced by the two infinitesimal payments. In summary, the Principal will choose
the triple of controls ζ “ pZ,Zµ,Γq where the payment rates pZ,Γq index the contract on the deviation consumption
of the considered consumer, in agreement with usual Principal–Agent moral hazard type of contracts for drift and
volatility control, and the payment rate Zµ indexes the contract on the behaviour of other consumers, represented by
the conditional law pµ.
Remark 3.3. Until now, we supposed that the Principal could not observe the common noise, or at least was not
allowed to directly index compensations on it. Whenever she can do so, we notice that the contract defined by (3.5) can
be written in the following way
ξt “ ξ0 ´
ż t
0
H˝pXs, ζsqds`
ż t
0
ZsdXs ` σ˝
ż t
0
pEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘‰dWs˝ ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RAZ2s
˘
dxXys
` 12RA
ż t
0
pEpµsqEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘Zµs ` qXs^¨˘d@ pX, qXDs‰`RA ż t
0
ZspEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘d@X, pXDs‰,
where for px, ζq P Rˆ Rˆ Lˆ R,
H˝px, ζq “ 12Hdpzq `
1
2Hvpγq `Hcpx, γq, (3.9)
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and thus does not depend on the others’ effort pα anymore. We can even go further in the simplifications by noticing
that, given the common noise, pX and qX are independent. Hence, recalling the notation Zµs “ pEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘‰, we haveż t
0
pEpµsqEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘Zµs ` qXs^¨˘d@ pX, rXDs‰ “ `σ˝˘2 ż t
0
pEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘‰qEpµs“Zµs ` qXs^¨˘‰ds “ `σ˝˘2 ż t
0
`
Z
µ
s
˘2ds,ż t
0
pEpµs“ZsZµs ` pXs^¨˘d@X, pXDs‰ “ `σ˝˘2 ż t
0
ZspEpµs“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘‰ds “ `σ˝˘2 ż t
0
ZsZ
µ
sds.
Therefore, the actual compensation parameter of the contract in this case is the triple ζ :“ `Z,Zµ,Γ˘ P V and the form
of contracts is
ξ0 ´
ż t
0
H˝pXs, ζsqds`
ż t
0
ZsdXs ` σ˝
ż t
0
Z
µ
sdWs˝ ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RAZ2s
˘
dxXys ` 12RA
`
σ˝
˘2 ż t
0
Z
µ
s
`
Z
µ
s ` 2Zs
˘
ds.
(3.10)
The previous form of contract is nothing more than a rewriting of the one given by (3.5). This shows that indexing
on the conditional law is actually a hidden indexing on the common noise: the compensation term in the contract
depending on others is rewritten as a term depending only on the common noise. Therefore, in the case where the
producer is allowed to use W ˝, she can directly offer this type of contracts. Otherwise, if there are some regulatory
reasons preventing her from using it directly in the contract, she can offer the contract in Definition 3.1. This being
said, when the Principal uses contracts in C˝, we need to add the common noise as a state variable in the value function
of the representative consumer, and can then show similarly that the contract is indexed on the common noise through
a parameter Z˝, and the payment rate ζ˝ chosen by the Principal is measurable with respect to the natural filtration
generated by X, W ˝ and pµ. Hence, if the Principal observes the common noise, we simply have to extend the space of
controls chosen by the Principal. In fact, the form of optimal contracts will be the same, leading to the same effort of
the consumers and the same utility for the Principal. We refer to Section 6.1 for the detailed contract and the resolution
of optimal contracting in this particular case.
The previous remark underlines the fact that if σ˝ “ 0, a simple contract in Definition 3.1 is exactly a standard contract
for drift and volatility control (see [1, 11, 12]). Therefore, in absence of common noise, it is straightforward to conclude
that considering contracts indexed on the consumption of the population of consumers do not improve the results given
in [1]. We refer to Section 5 for more details on this result.
3.2.3 Solving the mean–field game
By considering simple contracts, we are able to compute the optimal efforts of the representative Agent, which were
given informally by (3.4). Intuitively, maximising the Hamiltonian given by (3.3) is sufficient to obtain optimal efforts,
but the formal proof relies on the theory of 2BSDEs. We will note that the consumer’s optimal efforts do not depend
on the efforts of the others, which simplifies the task of obtaining the unique mean–field equilibrium given by Theorem
3.4. In other words, each consumer optimises his deviation consumption independently of everyone else. Therefore,
there is a unique mean–field equilibrium, given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Given a contract ξξ0,ζT P ΞS. indexed by the triple of parameters ζ :“ pZ,Zµ,Γq P V, there exists a
unique mean–field equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.6 denoted by pP‹, µ‹q where
piq the optimal drift effort of the consumer is given by the process α‹ :“ a‹pZq where
ak,‹pzq :“ ρkpz´ ^Amaxq, z P R, k “ 1, . . . , d;
piiq the optimal volatility effort of the consumer is given by the process β‹ :“ b‹pΓq where
bk,‹pγq :“ 1^ `λkγ´˘ ´1ηk`1 _Bmin, γ P R, k “ 1, . . . , d;
piiiq P‹ is the law of X driven by optimal controls
dXt “ ´ρ
`
Zt´ ^Amax
˘
dt` σ‹pΓtq ¨ dWt ` σ˝dWt˝ ; (3.11)
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pivq µ‹ is the conditional law of X given F˝.
Proof. The crux of the argument here is to use the general result of Proposition A.2 and Theorem A.3, and show
that we can construct directly a solution to 2BSDE (A.3) whenever ξξ0,ζ P ΞS. Assume that other players are playing
according to α‹ and β‹, meaning that pµ “ µ‹. In this case, the simplification (3.10) of the contract holds. Define then
Yt :“ ´e´RAξ
ξ0,ζ
t , Z1t :“ ´RAYtZt, Z2t :“ ´RAYtpEµ‹t “Zµt p pXt^¨q‰, Γt :“ ´RAYtΓt, t P r0, T s,
Kt :“
ż t
0
ˆ
´RAYsH˝pXs, ζsq ´ 12Γs
´
Ss `
`
σ˝
˘2¯´ F pXs, Ys, Z1s , Ssq˙ds, t P r0, T s,
where for any S ě 0, Σ´1pSq is the pre–image of the singleton tSu by the map Σ : B ÝÑ R`, where we denote by
ΣpBq the image of B by Σ, where the map F : Rˆ Rˆ Rˆ ΣpBq ÝÑ R is defined by
F px, y, z, Sq :“ sup
pa,bqPAˆΣ´1pSq
 ´ a ¨ 1dz `RAypcpa, bq ´ fpxqq(, px, y, z, Sq P Rˆ Rˆ Rˆ ΣpBq, (3.12)
and H˝ by Equation (3.9). A simple application of Ito¯’s formula then leads to
Yt “´ e´RAξT `
ż T
t
F
`
Xs, Ys, Z
1
s , Ss
˘
ds´
ż T
t
Z1sdXs ´ σ˝
ż T
t
Z2sdWs˝ `
ż T
t
dKs, t P r0, T s.
By definition of H˝ and F , we also directly check that K is always a non–decreasing process, which vanishes on the
support of any probability measure corresponding to the efforts β‹ defined in the statement of the proposition. Indeed,
dKs “ 12RAYs
´
inf
bPB
 
cβpbq ´ ΓsΣpbq
(´ inf
bPΣ´1pSsq
 
cβpbq
(` ΓsSs¯ds.
To ensure that pY, pZ1, Z2qJ,Kq solves 2BSDE (A.3), it therefore remains to check that all the integrability requirements
in Definition A.1 are satisfied, since the fixed–point constraint is satisfied by definition. The one for Y is immediate by
definition of the set V. The required integrability on ppZ1, Z2qJ,Kq then follows from [6, Theorem 2.1 and Proposition
2.1].
We have therefore obtained that the candidate provided in the statement of the proposition was indeed an equilibrium.
Let us now prove uniqueness. Let pν “ ppα, pβq be the arbitrary effort of other consumers, and the associated law pµ. In
this case, a contract ξξ0,ζ P ΞS no longer admits the decomposition (3.10). Nevertheless, ΞS Ă Ξ and by Proposition
A.2, the optimal effort ν‹ is the maximiser of the map F , and does not depend on pν. Although there is no uniqueness
in general of the probability P‹, and therefore of the effort β‹, the effort α‹ is unique and is the one defined in the
statement of the theorem. To sum up, given a contract in ΞS and for arbitrary efforts pν of others, each consumer
has a unique optimal drift effort α‹, independent of pν. We can therefore already conclude that the optimal effort α‹
is the same for all consumers. Using the dynamic of pX with α‹, the contract ξξ0,ζ admits the decomposition (3.10).
Therefore, we can apply the reasoning above to construct a solution to the 2BSDE (A.3), and we have now uniqueness
of the probability P‹, and therefore on the volatility effort β‹, given by point piiq of the theorem. To conclude, given an
arbitrary law pµ and a contract ξξ0,ζ P ΞS, the optimal effort is ν‹ “ pα‹, β‹q, inducing the law P‹ and the conditional
law µ‹. It is therefore the unique equilibrium.
Throughout this work, we will denote by v‹pz, γq :“ pa‹pzq, b‹pγqq the optimal response of a given agent. The cost
associated to this effort will be denoted by c‹pz, γq.
3.2.4 Interpretation of the optimal efforts
For a tuple of payment rates ζ P Rˆ Lˆ R,
piq the z component of the payment induces an effort of the consumer on all usages to reduce his consumption in
average. The effort on the k´th usage is proportional to its cost, 1{ρk, non increasing with z, positive if z is
negative and zero otherwise. Hence, the more z is negative, the more the Agent will reduce his consumption
deviation in average;
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piiq the component γ induces an effort only on the usages whose cost 1{λk is lower than the payment. If γ is non
negative, bk,‹pγq “ 1 for all usages, hence the consumer makes no effort on the volatility of his consumption
deviation. The more γ is negative, the more b will be close to zero, i.e. the more the Agent will reduce the
volatility of his consumption deviation;
piiiq the zµ component has no influence on the consumer’s efforts: although his payment is indexed on the devia-
tion consumption of others, the consumer will not take it into account to optimise his deviation consumption.
This model can be criticised but seems rather logical in the sense that a consumer optimises his consumption
independently of what his neighbours do, even if the price of electricity depends on the global demand.
Hence, the efforts of the consumer are the same as those defined in [1], although the contracts we consider have more
components. The additional components do not affect the optimal effort of the consumer.
Remark 3.5. These results are consistent with classical results on drift and volatility control psee [11] or [12]q, contracts
indexed by pz, γq are sufficient to incentivise the Agent for making effort on drift and volatility. Therefore it is quite
natural that another parameter in the contract will not directly affect the effort, but may increase the value function of
the Principal.
To sum up this section, we provided a new form of contracts, called simple contracts, allowing us to compute the
optimal efforts of the consumers and the associated mean–field equilibrium. The aim of the following section is to prove
that there is no loss of generality to consider only simple contracts, and thus to solve the Principal’s problem restricted
to simple contracts.
4 Principal’s problem
We recall that the optimisation problem of the Principal has been defined as follows
V P0 :“ sup
ξPΞ
sup
pP,µqPM‹pξq
EP
„
UP
ˆ
´ EP
„
ξ `
ż T
0
gpXsqds` θ2
ż T
0
dxXys
ˇˇˇˇ
FT˝
˙
.
Following the general approach of [12], we expect that there is no loss of generality for the Principal to restrict to
contracts in ΞS instead of Ξ. This property had been obtained before in [16] for general moral hazard problems with
interacting mean–field agents, but who were constrained to simply control the drift of the diffusion X. We show here
that this general result also extends to cases where volatility can be controlled as well, using 2BSDEs theory. Moreover,
any contract ξ P ΞS leads to a unique mean–field equilibrium by Theorem 3.4. For notational simplicity, we define for
any pξ0, ζq P Rˆ V the following process
Lξ0,ζt :“ ξξ0,ζt `
ż t
0
gpXsqds` θ2
ż t
0
dxXys, for t P r0, T s.
Theorem 4.1. The following equality holds
V P0 “ sup
pξ0,ζqPrU´1A pR0q,`8qˆV
EP
‹“
UP
`´ EP‹“Lξ0,ζT ˇˇFT˝ ‰˘‰ “ sup
ζPV
EP
‹”
UP
´
´ EP‹
”
L
U´1
A
pR0q,ζ
T
ˇˇˇ
FT˝
ı¯ı
.
The proof of this theorem is reported to Appendix A.4.
From now on, it is assumed that f and g have linear growths. Thus, the result of Proposition B.1 holds. To lighten
the notations, the exponent U´1A pR0q will often be omitted, since, using Proposition B.1, it is fixed once and for all by
U´1A pR0q “ ψp0, X0q. Notice that from the Principal’s point of view, when considering contracts in ΞS, and when the
consumers are at the unique equilibrium, the deviation of other consumers pX is nothing but a copy of X, in the sense
of Definition 2.4, which we denoted by rX. Besides, noticing that pµ “ µ‹, and imposing ξ0 :“ U´1A pR0q from now on
ξζt “ ξ0 ´
ż t
0
HpXs, µ‹s, ζs, α‹sqds`
ż t
0
ZsdXs `
ż t
0
rEµ‹s“Zµs p rXsqd rXs‰` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RAZ2s
˘
dxXys
` 12RA
`
σ˝
˘2 ż t
0
´rEµ‹s“Zµs p rXsq‰¯2ds`RA`σ˝˘2 ż t
0
ZsrEµ‹s“Zµs p rXsq‰ds.
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4.1 The general case
The attentive reader will have noticed that the right–hand side of Theorem 4.1 looks like the value function of a
stochastic control problem of a McKean–Vlasov stochastic differential equation with common noise. However, the state
variable L seems to be considered in the strong formulation (it is indexed by the control ζ), while the state variable
X is considered in weak formulation (the control ζ only impacts the distribution of X through P‹). From our point
of view, it makes little sense to consider a control problem of this form directly, and there is no reason why we should
adopt anything but the weak formulation to state the problem of the Principal, since this is the one which makes sense
for the problem of the Agent. We will therefore formulate it below.
Let V be the collection of all finite and positive Borel measures on r0, T sˆR3, whose projection on r0, T s is the Lebesgue
measure, and we call V0 the set of all q P V of the form δφspdvqdt for some Borel function φ. The intuition is that the
Principal’s problem depends only on time and on the conditional law µY of the state variable Y “ pX,LqJ. Following
the same methodology used for the Agent’s problem, to properly define the weak formulation of the Principal’s problem,
we are led to consider the following canonical space
ΩP :“ Ω˝ ˆ Ω1,P ˆ Ω2,P ˆ V, where ΩP,1 :“ Cpr0, T s,R2 ˆ Rdq, and ΩP,2 :“ PT pR2q,
with canonical process pW ˝, Y,W, µY ,ΛP q, where for any pt, w˝, y, w, u, qq P r0, T s ˆ ΩP
Wt˝ pw˝, y, w, u, qq :“ w˝ptq, Ytpw˝, y, w, u, qq :“ yptq, Wtpw˝, y, w, u, qq :“ wptq,
µYt pw˝, y, w, u, qq :“ uptq, ΛPt pw˝, y, w, u, qq :“ q.
Less formally, for all t P r0, T s, µYt P PpR2q will be the conditional distribution of Yt “ pXt, Ltq, and we will denote by
µX and µL the marginal distributions of µY . When no confusion is possible, in order to lighten the notations, we will
often omit the space for the integrals with respect to the conditional distribution, by denoting for example:ż
φpx, `qµY pdx, d`q :“
ż
R2
φpx, `qµY pdx, d`q, for any φ : R2 ÝÑ R.
The canonical filtration FP :“ pFPt qtPr0,T s is defined as
FPt :“ σ
´`
Ws˝ , Ys,Ws, µ
Y
s ,∆spϕq
˘
: ps, ϕq P r0, ts ˆ Cb
`r0, T s ˆ R3,R˘¯, t P r0, T s,
where Cbpr0, T s ˆ R3,Rq is the set of all bounded continuous functions from r0, T s ˆ R3 to R, and for any ps, ϕq P
r0, T s ˆ Cbpr0, T s ˆ R3,Rq, ∆spϕq :“
şs
0
ş
R3 ϕpr, vqΛP pdr, dvq. We also define FP,˝ :“ pFP,˝t qtPr0,T s, a smaller filtration
containing only the information generated by the common noise and the conditional law of Y , FP,˝t :“ σ
`pWs˝ , µYs q :
s P r0, ts˘, t P r0, T s. Let C2b pR2 ˆ Rd ˆ R,Rq be the set of bounded twice continuously differentiable functions from
R2ˆRdˆR to R, whose first and second derivatives are also bounded, and for any ps, ϕq P r0, T sˆC2b pR2ˆRdˆR,Rq,
we set
MPs pϕq :“ ϕpYs,Ws,Ws˝ q ´
ż s
0
ż
U
ˆ
AP pvq ¨∇ϕpYr,Wr,Wr˝ q ` 12Tr
“
D2ϕpYr,Wr,Wr˝ qBP pvqBJP pvq
‰˙
ΛP pdr, dvq,
where D2ϕ denotes the Hessian matrix of ϕ, AP and BP are respectively the drift vector and the diffusion matrix of
the vector process pY,W,W ˝qJ
AP pvq :“
¨˚
˚˝´ρ
`
z´ ^Amax
˘
b
`
Xt, v
˘
0d
0
‹˛‹‚, BP pvq :“
¨˚
˚˝ 0 0 σ
‹pγqJ σ˝
0 0 zσ‹pγqJ pz ` zµqσ˝
0d 0d Id 0d
0 0 0Jd 1
‹˛‹‚, (4.1)
where for v :“ pz, zµ, γq P R3
bpx, vq :“ c‹pz, γq ` gpxq ´ fpxq ` 12RAz
2Σ‹pγq ` 12RA
`
σ˝
˘2`
z ` zµ˘2 ` θ2`Σ‹pγq ` `σ˝˘2˘.
We fix some initial condition, namely a probability measure %P on R2 representing the law at 0 of Y . The marginals
of %P are given by %, the law of X0, and ψp0, ¨q ˝ %, the law of U´1A pR0q “ ψp0, X0q. We then let MP be the set of all
probability measures on pΩP ,FPT q and define then the subset Q ĂMP of all P such that
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piq MP pϕq is a pP,FP q´local martingale on r0, T s for all ϕ P C2b pR2 ˆ Rd ˆ R,Rq;
piiq P ˝ pY0q´1 “ %P , and P ˝
`pW0,W0˝ q˘´1 “ ι;
piiiq P“ΛP P V0s “ 1;
pivq for P´a.e. ω P ΩP and for every t P r0, T s, we have µYt pωq “ Pωt ˝ pYtq´1, where pPωt qωPΩ is a family of regular
conditional probability distribution (r.c.p.d) for P given FP,˝t ;
pvq pW ˝, µY q is P´independent of W .
Following the reasoning developed in Subsection 2.2, we can construct a copy of the canonical space ΩP and a copy of
Y in the sense of Definitions 2.3 and 2.4. Thanks to the previous formulation, we can write the weak formulation of
the Principal’s problem as follows
V P0 “ sup
PPQ
EP
”
UP
´
´ EµLT
”
Lζ
P
T
ı¯ı
.
Remark 4.2. First, recall that simple contracts were defined as random variables of the form pξξ0,ζT q, for pξ0, ζq P RˆV.
By Equation (4.1), we notice that the drift vector and the diffusion matrix of the process pY,W,W ˝qJ are defined as
function of v “ pz, zµ, γq. This is why we consider that the Principal controls, through a probability P P Q, the triple of
controls ζP “ pZ,Zµ,Γq P V, where for all t P r0, T s, Zµt “ rEµXt rZµt p rXtqs, instead of ζP P V. Moreover, the conditional
laws of X and L do not impact their dynamics, therefore the Principal’s problem does not seem to be a McKean–Vlasov
control problem, but only a standard control problem. Nevertheless, the Principal’s criterion reveals the conditional law
of L, which transforms the problem into a McKean–Vlasov one.
In order to apply the chain rule with common noise to functions depending on time and conditional distribution, we
define the regularity assumption needed.
Definition 4.3 (C1,2´Regularity). A function u : r0, T sˆPpRdq ÝÑ R, pt, µq ÞÝÑ upt, µq is smooth enough in the sense
of Chain Rule under C1,2´Regularity if
piq u is differentiable with respect to t, and the partial derivative Btu : r0, T s ˆ PpRdq ÝÑ R is continuous;
piiq for all t P r0, T s, the mapping µ P PpRdq ÞÝÑ upt, µq is simply C2, in the sense defined in [7, Section 4.3.2], and
satisfies the assumptions of [7, Theorem 4.14].
The previous definition allows us to consider the natural extension for time dependent functions of the chain rule under
C2´regularity defined in [7, Theorem 4.14]. Therefore, for any function v : r0, T s ˆPpR2q ÝÑ R smooth enough in the
sense of Definition 4.3, the chain rule under C1,2´regularity is written as
dvpt, µYt q “ Btvpt, µYt qdt` Eµ
Y
t
“BµvP pt, µYt qpYtq ¨ dYt‰` 12EµYt rEµYt ”Tr“B2µvP pt, µYt q`Yt, rYt˘dxY, rY yt‰ı
` 12E
µYt
”
Tr
“ByBµvP pt, µYt qpYtqdxY yt‰ı,
where rY is a copy of Y in the sense of Definition 2.4.
Remark 4.4. Notice that another way to obtain this chain rule is to simplify the chain rule in [7, Theorem 4.17] by
considering a function which does not depend on the state process.
We are thus led to consider the following HJB equation, which is a simplified version of the Master equation given in
[7, Section 4.4.2], since, intuitively, the Principal’s problem only depends on time and on the conditional law µ of Y ,
and not directly on the state Y
0 “ Btvpt, µYt q ` 12
`
σ˝
˘2ˆĳ B2µXvpt, µYt q`y, ry˘µYt pdyqµYt pdryq ` ż ´θBµLvpt, µYt qpyq ` BxBµXvpt, µYt qpyq¯µYt pdyq˙
`
ż
BµLvpt, µYt qpyqpg ´ fqpxqµYt pdyq ` 12 supvPR3 h
`
µYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, v
˘
, (4.2)
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with terminal condition vpT, µYT q “ UP
`´ EµLT rLT s˘ and where, for any vµ P L1ˆ2, vy,µ P L2ˆ2 and vµ,µ P `L2˘2ˆ2,
hpµ, vµ, vy,µ, vµ,µ, vq :“´ 2ρ
`
z´ ^Amax
˘ ż
v1µpyqµpdyq ` 2c‹pz, γq
ż
v2µpyqµpdyq
` Σ‹pγq
ż ´`
θ `RAz2
˘
v2µpyq ` v1,1y,µpyq ` z2v2,2y,µpyq ` 2zv1,2y,µpyq
¯
pyqµpdyq
` `σ˝˘2`z ` zµ˘2 ż ˆRAv2µpyq ` v2,2y,µpyq ` ż v2,2µ,µ`y, ry˘µpdryq˙µpdyq
` 2`σ˝˘2`z ` zµ˘ ż ˆv1,2µ,µpy, ryqµpdryq ` v1,2y,µpyq˙µpdyq, (4.3)
Theorem 4.5. If there is a solution v to PDE (4.2), smooth enough in the sense of Definition 4.3, with partial
derivatives satisfying for each P P Q
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˆż
BµXvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx,d`q
˙2
dt
˙1{2
` EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ ż
BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q
ˇˇˇˇ p1
p1´1

ă `8, (4.4)
where p1 ą 1 is the exponent appearing in Lemma A.4, and a function v‹ : r0, T s ˆ PpR2q ÝÑ R3 satisfying
hpµYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, v‹pt, µYt qq “ sup
vPR3
hpµYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, vq,
then
piq vp0, µY0 q “ V P0 ;
piiq the process ζ‹ defined for all t P r0, T s by ζ‹t :“ v‹pt, µYt q is an optimal triple of parameters for the contract.
We refer to Appendix A.5 for the proof of this Proposition. In the following two subsections, we will specify the utility
function UP in order to consider two different cases:
‚ the case of a risk–averse Principal, with a CARA utility function and a risk–aversion parameter RP ą 0, in
Subsection 4.1.1;
‚ the case of a risk–neutral Principal, with UP pxq “ x, in Subsection 4.1.2.
All the functions defined in the first case will be indexed by P to make the dependency explicit on RP , for example
V P for the value of the Principal’s problem. For the sake of consistency, they will be indexed by 0 in the second
case, meaning that, informally, it is sufficient to set RP “ 0 in a function defined in the risk–averse case to obtain the
function in risk–neutral case.
4.1.1 Principal with CARA utility
Under a constant relative risk aversion specification of the utility function of the producer, that is UP pxq :“ ´e´RP x,
for some risk–aversion RP ą 0, we are looking for a solution vP of (4.2) with the form
vP pt, µYt q “ ´eRP
`
Eµ
L
t rLts´uP pt,µXt q
˘
, with uP pT, µXT q “ 0. (4.5)
To lighten to notations, we will denote, for all function u : r0, T s ˆ PpRq ÝÑ R,
uµX pt, µq :“
ż
BµXu
`
t, µ
˘pxqµpdxq, ux,µX pt, µq :“ ż BxBµXu`t, µ˘pxqµpdxq,
and uµX ,µX pt, µq :“
ĳ
B2µXuP
`
t, µ
˘px, rxqµpdxqµpdrxq, for pt, µq P r0, T s ˆ PpRq,
and we define the risk–aversion ratio R as 1{R :“ 1{RA ` 1{RP , with the convention R “ 0 if RA or RP is equal to
zero. It remains to solve a simplified HJB for the function uP :
0 “ ´ BtuP
`
t, µXt
˘` ż pg ´ fqpxqµXt pdxq ` θ2`σ˝˘2 ´ 12`σ˝˘2uPx,µX `t, µXt ˘` 12´`σ˝˘2R´ ρ¯`uPµX `t, µXt ˘˘2
´ 12
`
σ˝
˘2
uPµX ,µX
`
t, µXt
˘` 12 infzPR!F0`q`z, uPx,µX `t, µXt ˘˘˘` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` uPµX `t, µXt ˘˘2), (4.6)
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with terminal condition uP
`
T, µXT
˘ “ 0, and where
qpz, uq :“ θ `RAz2 ´ u and F0pqq :“ inf
γă0tΣ
‹pγqq ` c‹βpγqu.
In order to apply Theorem 4.5, we however need to ensure that Condition (4.4) holds for the function vP . Therefore, we
assume that there exists some p ą p1p1´1 such that the following technical condition on the integrability of the contracts
is enforced
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
epRPE
P
“
ξζt
ˇˇ
F˝t
‰
ă `8. (4.7)
We will make use of the notation ε “appp1 ´ 1q{p1. Under this assumption on contracts, we derive from Theorem 4.5
the following verification result.
Proposition 4.6. Let u be a solution to PDE (4.6), smooth enough in the sense of Definition 4.3 and satisfying
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘ˇˇ2dt˙ p12 ` sup
0ďtďT
exp
ˆ
´ q
1p1
p1 ´ 1RPupt, µ
X
t q
˙
ă `8, (4.8)
for q1 “ ε{pε´ 1q. Moreover, let v‹ : r0, T s ˆ PpRq ÝÑ R3 be a function satisfying
hP
`
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘
, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘
, v‹
`
t, µXt
˘˘ “ inf
vPR3
hP puµX
`
t, µXt
˘
, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘
, v
˘
,
where
hP pu1, u2, vq :“ Σ‹pγq
`
h`RAz2 ´ u2
˘` c‹βpγq ` c‹αpzq ` 2ρ`z´ ^Amax˘u1
` `σ˝˘2pRA `RP q`z ` zµ˘2 ´ 2RP `σ˝˘2`z ` zµ˘u1, (4.9)
then
piq V P0 “ ´eRP pξ0´up0,µX0 qq;
piiq the optimal payment rate to induce a reduction of the average consumption deviation is a process Z‹, defined
for all t P r0, T s by Z‹t “ z‹
`
t, µXt
˘
, where the function z‹ is solution of the minimisation problem in (4.6) and
satisfies
z‹pt, µq “ 0, when uµX pt, µq ě 0, and z‹pt, µq P
“
uµX pt, µq _ ´Amax, 0
‰
when uµX
`
t, µ
˘ ď 0;
piiiq the optimal payment rate Zµ,‹ is a process defined for all t P r0, T s by Zµ,‹t “ zµ,‹
`
t, µXt
˘
where
zµ,‹pt, µq :“ ´z‹pt, µq ` RP
RA `RP uµX pt, µq.
Recalling that Zµ,‹s :“ rEµs“Zµ,‹s p rXsq‰, we can arbitrary set that zµ,‹pt, µqpxq ” zµ,‹pt, µq for all x P R.
pivq the optimal payment rate Γ‹ to induce a reduction of the volatility of the consumption deviation is a process
defined for all t P r0, T s by Γ‹t “ γ‹
`
t, µXt
˘
where
γ‹pt, µq :“ ´max
"
θ ´ ux,µX pt, µq `RA
`
z‹pt, µq˘2, 1
λ
*
, where λ “ max
k“1,...,dλ
k;
pvq the second-best optimal contract is given by
U´1A pR0q ´
ż T
0
HpXs, µXs , ζ‹s, α‹sqds`
ż T
0
Z‹s
`
dXs ´ rEµs“d rXs‰˘` RP
RA `RP
ż T
0
uµX
`
s, µXs
˘rEµXs “d rXs‰
` 12
ż T
0
`
Γ‹s `RA
`
Z‹s
˘2˘dxXys ` 12 RAR2PpRA `RP q2 `σ˝˘2
ż T
0
`
uµX
`
s, µXs
˘˘2ds´ 12RA`σ˝˘2
ż T
0
`
Z‹s
˘2ds,
where H was defined above in (3.6).
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We refer to Appendix A.6 for the proof of this proposition, which is a consequence of Theorem 4.5.
Interpretation of the optimal contract. The most interesting part of the optimal contract is given by Proposition
4.6 pvq, and concerns the infinitesimal payment Z‹s
`
dXs ´ rEµs“d rXs‰˘. Indeed, since Z‹ ď 0 by Proposition 4.6 piiq,
this payment is positive if the consumer’s deviation consumption is below the mean of others’ deviation. Conversely,
if the consumer make less effort than the rest of the pool, this part of the compensation will be negative. Therefore, a
part of the compensation is based on the comparison between the deviation consumption of a consumer and the mean
of others’ deviation consumption.
In addition to that, we can derive a more illuminating form of contract by denoting by X˝ the deviation consumption
without common noise, whose dynamic under optimal efforts is given by
dXt˝ “ ´ρ
`pZ‹t q´ ^Amax˘dt` σ‹pΓ‹t q ¨ dWt.
The contract can thus be written in terms of the common noise as
U´1A pR0q ´
ż t
0
H`Xs˝ ` σ˝Ws˝ , ζ‹s˘ds` ż t
0
Z‹sdXs˝ ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γ‹s `RA
`
Z‹s
˘2˘dxX˝ys ` RP
RA `RP σ
˝
ż t
0
uPµX
`
s, µXs
˘
dWs˝
` 12
RAR
2
P
pRA `RP q2
`
σ˝
˘2 ż t
0
`
uPµX
`
s, µXs
˘˘2ds, (4.10)
where Hpx, ζ‹q :“ 12Hdpz
‹q ` 12Hvpγ
‹q ` fpxq. We can then divide the study of the contract in two parts
piq The first line of the contract defined in (4.10) is the classical contract form for drift and volatility control, indexed
on the process X˝, that is the part of the deviation consumption which is really controlled by the Agent:
• the contract is linear in the level of X˝ and its quadratic variation xX˝y;
• by responding to the contract with optimal efforts, the consumer gains a certain amount of utility. Therefore,
the Principal can subtract the certainty equivalent of this utility gain from the contract, that is the constant
part
şt
0H
`
Xs˝ ` σ˝Ws˝ , ζ‹s
˘
ds;
• due to the risk–aversion of the consumer, the additional payment 12RA
`
Z‹t
˘2dxX˝yt is needed to compensate
the infinitesimal payment Z‹t dXt˝ .
Since the common noise W ˝ represents in our framework the climate hazards, the process X˝ can also be seen as
the deviation consumption adjusted for climate hazards. Therefore, this part of the contract is a fixed compen-
sation, independent of weather conditions.
piiq The other part of the contract is an indexation on the common noise, that is the remaining risk the Principal
wants to give to the Agent. As for the infinitesimal payment ZtdXt, due to the risk aversion of the consumer,
the term RPRA`RP σ
˝uPµX
`
s, µXs
˘
dWs˝ , must be compensated by
1
2RA
ˆ
RP
RA `RP σ
˝uPµX
`
s, µXs
˘˙2
dxW ˝ys “ 12
RAR
2
P
pRA `RP q2
`
σ˝
˘2`
uPµX
`
s, µXs
˘˘2ds.
We can already notice that, if the Principal is risk–neutral, she will not use at all the common noise to provide incentives
to the Agent. Indeed, since she is risk–neutral and the consumers are risk–averse, it is too costly to share the risk, and
she can bear it alone. We refer to the next Subsection for the detailed contract in the risk–neutral case.
The conclusion of this interpretation is that the indexation of the contract on others allows the Principal to divide
the deviation consumption of an Agent into two parts: the part which is really controlled by the Agent, X˝, and the
common noise. Hence, she offers a compensation indexed on the controlled deviation X˝ to encourage the Agent for
making effort on the drift and the volatility. Moreover, if she is risk–averse, she adds to this contract a part indexed
on the common noise, to share the remaining risk, even if regulatory rules prevent her from using the common noise
directly in the contract.
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Remark 4.7. In the case where the consumers are risk–neutral pRA “ 0q, PDE (4.6) reduces to
0 “ ´ BtuP
`
t, µXt
˘` ż pg ´ fqpxqµXt pdxq ` θ2`σ˝˘2 ´ 12`σ˝˘2uPx,µX `t, µXt ˘´ 12ρ`uPµX `t, µXt ˘˘2
´ 12
`
σ˝
˘2
uPµX ,µX
`
t, µXt
˘` 12F0`θ ´ uPx,µX `t, µXt ˘˘` 12 infzPR!ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` uPµX `t, µXt ˘˘2).
Noting that the infimum is attained for all t P r0, T s at Z‹t “ uPµX
`
t, µXt
˘
, the optimal payment rate Γ‹ to induce a
reduction of the volatility of the consumption deviation is
Γ‹t “ ´max
"
θ ´ uPx,µX
`
t, µXt
˘
,
1
λ
*
,
and the optimal payment rate Zµ,‹ is
Z
µ,‹
t “ ´Z‹t ` uPµX
`
t, µXt
˘ “ 0 for all t P r0, T s.
Hence, the certainty equivalent of the Principal’s utility and the resulting optimal contract does not depend on the
producer’s risk aversion RP . Moreover, since Z
µ,‹ “ 0, the contract is not indexed on the law of other consumers. This
result is particularly interesting since this contract has a classical form in the sense of [1] extended to a common noise
model. Note that unlike the literature on Principal–Agent problems considering one Agent, the case RA “ 0 does not
coincide with the first–best problem psee Appendix 6.2).
4.1.2 Risk–neutral Principal
The value function of a risk–neutral Principal is defined as V 00 “ supPPQ EP
“´ EµLT “LζPT ‰‰. Under this specification for
UP , we are looking for a solution v0 of (4.2) with the form
v0pt, µYt q “ ´Eµ
L
t
”
Lζt
ı
` u0`t, µXt ˘, with u0`T, µXT ˘ “ 0. (4.11)
By adapting the reasoning of Proposition 4.6, we obtain the following HJB associated to u0
0 “ ´ Btu0pt, µXt q `
ż
pg ´ fqpxqµXt pdxq ` θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12`σ˝˘2u0x,µX `t, µXt ˘´ 12ρ`u0µX `t, µXt ˘˘2
´ 12
`
σ˝
˘2
u0µX ,µX
`
t, µXt
˘` 12 infzPR!F0`q`z, u0x,µX `t, µXt ˘˘˘` ρ``z´ ^Amax˘` u0µX `t, µXt ˘˘2), (4.12)
with terminal condition u0
`
T, µXT
˘ “ 0. This result can be found intuitively by setting RP “ 0 in (4.6). Similarly, we
can deduce the following result from Proposition 4.6 with RP “ 0.
Proposition 4.8. If there is a solution u to the PDE (4.12), smooth enough in the sense of Definition 4.3, such that
the following condition is satisfied
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘ˇˇ2dt˙1{2 ă `8, (4.13)
and a function v‹ : r0, T s ˆ PpRq ÝÑ R3 satisfying
h0
`
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘
, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘
, v‹
`
t, µXt
˘˘ “ inf
vPR3
h0
`
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘
, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘
, v
˘
,
then
piq V 00 “ ´ξ0 ` up0, µX0 q;
piiq the optimal payment rate to induce a reduction of the average consumption deviation is the process Z‹ defined for
all t P r0, T s by Z‹t “ z‹
`
t, µXt
˘
where the function z‹ is the optimiser of the minimisation problem in (4.12), and
satisfies
z‹pt, µq “ 0, when uµX pt, µq ě 0, and z‹pt, µq P
“
uµX pt, µq _ ´Amax, 0
‰
when uµX pt, µq ď 0;
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piiiq the optimal payment rate Zµ,‹ is equal to ´Z‹;
pivq the optimal payment rate Γ‹ is defined for all t P r0, T s by Γ‹t :“ γ‹t
`
t, µXt
˘
where
γ‹pt, µq :“ ´max
"
θ ´ ux,µX pt, µq `RApz‹pt, µqq2, 1
λ
*
;
pvq let ζ‹ :“ `Z‹, Zµ,‹,Γ‹˘, then the second–best optimal contract is given by
ξ0 ´
ż t
0
HpXs, µXs , ζ‹s, α‹sqds`
ż t
0
Z‹s
`
dXs ´ rEµs“d rXs‰˘` 12
ż t
0
`
Γ‹s `RA
`
Z‹s
˘2˘dxXys ´ 12RA`σ˝˘2
ż t
0
`
Z‹s
˘2ds.
Proof. The proof consists simply in a slight adaptation of the proof in Appendix A.6, by showing that the function v0,
defined as (4.11), satisfies the assumptions necessary for the application of Theorem 4.5. Noticing thatż
BµXvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q “ uµX
`
t, µXt
˘
and
ż
BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q “ ´1,
and since u satisfies the condition (4.13), we directly deduce that v satisfies (4.4).
Remark 4.9. Notice that the risk–neutral Principal’s problem can be rewritten as follows V 00 “ supPPQ EP
“ ´ LζPT ‰.
Therefore, it is a standard stochastic control problem and can thus be solved in the classical way. Nevertheless, for the
sake of consistency throughout this paper, we choose to solve it using Theorem 4.5.
Interpretation of the optimal contract. As in the previous subsection, to better see the compensation the consumer
will receive, we can denote by X˝ his deviation consumption without common noise, and write the contract in term of
common noise:
ξζ
‹
t “ ξ0 ´
ż t
0
H`Xs˝ ` σ˝Ws˝ , ζ‹s˘ds` ż t
0
Z‹sdXs˝ ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γ‹s `RA
`
Z‹s
˘2˘dxX˝ys. (4.14)
Therefore, in the risk–neutral case, the optimal contract is the classical contract form for drift and volatility control,
indexed on the process X˝, the deviation consumption adjusted for climatic hazards. This result comes from the fact
that the Principal uses the indexation of the contract on the deviation of others, zµ, to isolate the common noise.
Hence, she has a clear view of what is the deviation consumption of the Agents, without the common noise (X˝).
Therefore, she can offer a payment which is only indexed on the part of the consumption which is really optimised by
the Agents. In this particular case of risk–averse Agents and risk–neutral Principal, the Principal can bear the risk
alone and offers a contract which does not depend on the common noise.
4.2 Application to linear energy value discrepancy (EVD)
Following the line of [1], to obtain closed–form solutions, we consider in this section the case where
pf ´ gqpxq “ δx, x P R.
In this case, comparing the Agents’ preferences for their consumption (represented by the function f) with the Principal’s
preference for production (represented by g) can be summarised by studying the sign of δ. More precisely, a positive
δ means that an increase in consumption provides more utility to the consumers than it is costly for the producer.
Therefore, a reduction of the consumption has a negative effect more important on the consumers’ utilities than the
positive effect on the producer’s utility. Similarly, δ negative means that an increase of consumption induces more cost
for the producer than the benefit generated for the consumer. Therefore, intuitively, if δ is negative, it will be easier
for the Principal to incentivise the consumers to reduce their consumption.
Under this assumption, we derive a closed-form solution in both cases of a risk–averse and risk–neutral Principal and
more explicit optimal payment rates. To lighten the notation, we define
hpt, zq :“ F0
`
θ `RAz2
˘` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tq˘2, pt, zq P r0, T s ˆ R.
We sum up the results in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.10. Let the energy value discrepancy be linear, i.e. pf ´ gqpxq “ δx, x P R. Define the certainty
equivalent function uP as
uP pt, µXt q :“ δpT ´ tq
ż
xµXt pdxq ´
ż T
t
mP psqds, where mP ptq :“ θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ` 12´`σ˝˘2R´ ρ¯δ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPRhpt, zq,
then
piq the optimal payment rate process ζ‹ “ `Z‹, Zµ,‹,Γ‹˘ is a deterministic function of time, independent of σ˝ and
is defined by
Z‹t “ Arg min
zPR hpt, zq, Z
µ,‹
t “ ´Z‹t ` RPRA `RP δpT ´ tq and Γ
‹
t “ ´max
"
θ `RApZ‹t q2, 1
λ
*
.
for all t P r0, T s.
piiq the value function of a producer with a CARA utility function and a risk–aversion parameter RP is given by
V P0 “ ´eRP pξ0´uP p0,µX0 qq;
piiiq the value function of a risk–neutral producer is given by V 00 “ ´ξ0 ` u0p0, µX0 q.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is a straightforward application of Propositions 4.6 and 4.8 with the specification
pf ´ gqpxq “ δx, since the functions uP and u0 respectively satisfy Conditions (4.8) and (4.13). Indeed, noticing that
uPµX
`
t, µXt
˘ “ u0µX `t, µXt ˘ “ δpT ´ tq, we clearly have
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
uPµX
`
t, µXt
˘ˇˇ2dt˙ p12  “ δp1 T 3p1{2
3p1{2
ă `8 and EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
u0µX
`
t, µXt
˘ˇˇ2dt˙1{2 “ δ T 3{2?
3
ă `8.
Therefore, u0 satisfies the condition (4.13). To show that uP satisfies (4.8), it remains to prove that
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
e´
q1p1
p1´1RP
`
δpT´tqEPrXt|F˝t s`
şT
t
mP psqds
˘
,ă `8
which is true since mP is continuous and X has bounded drift and volatility.
The above proposition underlines the fact that the optimal payment rates pZ‹,Γ‹q are the same, in both cases of a
risk–averse or risk–neutral Principal. Hence, the efforts of the consumers on their deviation consumptions will be the
same, whatever the risk aversion of the Principal. The Principal controls the risk she wants to bear thanks to the
control Zµ. Indeed, in the risk–neutral case, the Principal does not care about the risk, hence Zµ is such that the
contract does not depend on the common noise. On the other hand, in the risk–averse case, the Agent is remunerated
for a part of the common noise: the risk induced by the common noise is shared between the Agent and the Principal.
Moreover, one can notice that in this particular case, the only information that the Principal uses from the conditional
law µX is actually the conditional mean. Indeed, the only term with µX appears in the certainty equivalent function
uP of the producer, with the form
ş
xµXt pdxq which is equal to ErXt|Ft˝ s.
Remark 4.11. For all t P r0, T s, the optimal payment rate Z‹t is equal to zero if δ is non-negative and lies between
δpT ´ tq _ ´Amax and 0 if δ ă 0.
5 Comparison with classical contracts
The aim of this section is to study the benefits of indexing the contracts on the distribution of the deviation of other
consumers. We thus consider, as a benchmark case, the producer’s problem when incentives are limited to payments for
efforts of the considered consumer. More precisely, we consider only contracts controlled by ζ0 :“ pZ, 0,Γq instead of
ζ :“ pZ,Zµ,Γq. We denote by V0 the corresponding restriction of V. We provide the optimal contract ξ0 and effort of
the consumers in Subsection 5.1. We focus on the linear energy value discrepancy (EVD) case to compare the results,
in terms of consumers’ effort and producer’s utility, between the two types of contracts, in both cases of a risk–averse
(see Subsection 5.2) or a risk–neutral producer (Subsection 5.3).
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5.1 Optimal form of contracts
We consider the same model, with the same dynamic of the deviation consumption X, but we restrict our study to
contracts offered by the Principal to a consumer depending only his deviation. This type of contracts has the classical
form of contracts for drift and volatility control (see [1], [11], [12]):
ξ0T “ ξ0 ´
ż T
0
H˝pXt, ζ0t qdt`
ż T
0
ZtdXt ` 12
ż T
0
`
Γt `RAZ2t
˘
dxXyt,
where ζ0 :“ pZ, 0,Γq, an Rˆ t0u ˆ R´valued F´predictable process, is the set of parameters chosen by the Principal
and with ξ0 “ U´1A pR0q.
By directly applying the results of [1], the consumer’s optimal response to this contract is the same function of pZ,Γq
as in Theorem 3.4, ν‹
`
ζ0
˘ “ pα‹pZq, β‹pΓqq. This result was expected since the effort of the representative consumer
in Theorem 3.4 does not depend on the component Zµ, and is consistent with the Remark 3.5. Thus, these contracts
lead obviously to the same unique mean–field equilibrium as the one defined in Theorem 3.4.
The Principal has to choose optimally the indexation parameters pZ,Γq to maximise her utility. Her value function is
the same as before, but restricted to the controls ζ0 P V0
V 0,P0 :“ sup
ζ0PV0
EP
”
UP
´
´ EP
”
Lζ
0
T
ˇˇˇ
FT˝
ı¯ı
. (5.1)
Following the lines of the Section 4, we obtain an HJB equation similar to (4.2), but with the supremum on ζ0
(intuitively by considering Zµ “ 0 in (4.2)). Therefore, we can establish an analogous result to Theorem 4.5.
5.2 Principal with CARA utility
5.2.1 Theoretical results
Under a CARA specification of the utility function of the producer, by mimicking Section 4.1.1, we expect a solution
v0,P to the HJB equation associated with (5.1) to be given by
v0,P pt, µYt q “ ´eRP
`
Eµ
L
t
“
Lζ
0
t
‰
´u0,P pt,µXt q
˘
, (5.2)
where u0,P satisfies the following PDE (similar to (4.6))
0 “ ´ Btu0,P `
ż
pg ´ fqpxqµXt pdxq ` θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12`σ˝˘2u0,Px,µX ´ 12`σ˝˘2u0,PµX ,µX ´ 12ρ`u0,PµX ˘2
` 12 infzPR
!
F0
`
q
`
z, u0,P
x,µX
˘˘`RA`σ˝˘2z2 ` ρ``z´ ^Amax˘` u0,PµX ˘2 `RP `σ˝˘2`´ z ` u0,PµX ˘2), (5.3)
with terminal condition u0,P pT, µXT q “ 0. We can state the equivalent of Proposition 4.6 in our benchmark case with
classical contracts.
Proposition 5.1. If there is a solution u to PDE (5.3), smooth enough in the sense of Definition 4.3, satisfying the
condition (4.8), and a function v0,‹ : r0, T s ˆ PT pRq ÝÑ Rˆ t0u ˆ R that reaches the infimum of hP defined by (4.9),
then
piq V 0,P0 “ ´eRP pξ0´up0,µX0 qq;
piiq the optimal payment rate to induce a reduction of the average consumption deviation is the process Z0,‹ defined
for all t P r0, T s by Z0,‹t :“ z0,‹
`
t, µXt
˘
where the function z0,‹ is the minimiser of the minimisation problem in
(5.3);
piiiq the optimal payment rate Γ0,‹ to induce a reduction of the volatility of the consumption deviation is defined for
all t P r0, T s by Γ0,‹t :“ γ0,‹
`
t, µXt
˘
where
γ0,‹pt, µq :“ ´max
"
θ ´ ux,µX pt, µq `RApz0,‹pt, µqq2, 1
λ
*
.
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Remark 5.2. In the case where the consumers are risk–neutral pRA “ 0q, the PDE reduces to
0 “ ´ Btu0,P `
ż
pg ´ fqpxqµXpdxq ` θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12`σ˝˘2u0,Px,µX ´ 12`σ˝˘2u0,PµX ,µX ´ 12ρ`u0,PµX ˘2
` 12F0
`
θ ´ u0,P
x,µX
˘` 12 infzPR
"
ρ
``
z´ ^Amax
˘` u0,P
µX
˘2 `RP `σ˝˘2`´ z ` u0,PµX ˘2*,
Hence, the infimum is attained for z‹ :“ u0,P
µX
and, similarly to Remark 4.7, the resulting optimal contract do depend
on the producer’s risk aversion RP .
In order to obtain closed–form solutions, we can study the case of the linear EVD, similarly to Proposition 4.10. To
lighten the notations, we denote
h
P pt, zq :“ F0pθ `RAz2q `RA
`
σ˝
˘2
z2 ` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tq˘2 `RP `σ˝˘2`´ z ` δpT ´ tq˘2.
Proposition 5.3. Let the energy value discrepancy be linear, i.e. pf ´ gqpxq “ δx, x P R. Then,
piq the producer’s value function is given by V 0,P0 “ ´eRP pξ0´u0,P p0,µX0 qq where the certainty equivalent function u0,P
is characterised by
u0,P pt, µXt q “ δpT ´ tq
ż
xµXt pdxq ´
ż T
t
m0,P psqds, where m0,P ptq :“ θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12ρδ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPRhP pt, zq,
piiq the optimal payment rate process ζ0,‹ “ `Z0,‹, 0,Γ0,‹˘ is a deterministic function of time given by
Z0,‹t “ Arg min
zPR h
P pt, zq and Γ0,‹t “ ´max
"
θ `RA
`
Z0,‹t
˘2
,
1
λ
*
for t P r0, T s.
The main point is to study the consumers’ effort and the producer’s utility when she offers new contracts compared to
classical ones, through a comparative analysis of the previous proposition with Proposition 4.10.
5.2.2 Numerical results and discussion
To compare the efforts of consumers on the average level of their consumption, we need to compare Z‹ with Z0,‹, and
Γ‹ with Γ0,‹ for their efforts on the volatility, since, by Theorem 3.4, for t P r0, T s,
α‹t :“ a‹pZ‹t q and β‹t :“ b‹pΓ‹t q.
Although some inequalities can be obtained analytically, it may be required to numerically compute the optimal payment
rate Z‹, since this is the only quantity for which we cannot get a closed–form expression in the linear EVD case, see
Proposition 4.10. For numerical computations, the calibration of the parameters detailed in [1] is used. More precisely,
we will consider most of the time T “ 5.5, θ “ 4ˆ 10´4, κ “ 11.76, δ “ ´55.44, RP “ 6ˆ 10´3, RA “ 5, 7ˆ 10´3, ρ “
2.93ˆ 10´5, η “ 1, λ “ 3.3ˆ 10´2. We will explicitly indicate different values for specific parameters, for instance when
we investigate the influence of RP on the utility of the Principal. Concerning the volatility calibrated in [1] (namely
the nominal volatility, with value 0.064 W/h1{2), we will suppose that it is equal to the total volatility without effort in
our model, i.e.
a
Σp1q ` pσ˝q2. Hence, we will consider different values for σ˝ but such that the total volatility without
effort remains constant, equal to 0.064. Notice that the numerical computations will be performed for d “ 1.
Comparison of efforts. In order to compare the effort of the consumers, we need to distinguish two cases, depending
on the sign of the linear EVD parameter δ.
piqWe first focus on the most representative case where δ ď 0, since empirical results in [1] provide δ “ ´55.44. However,
analytic comparison of efforts in this case is not clear. Figure 1 represents the optimal efforts of the consumers on the
drift and the volatility for two values of RP close to the one calibrated in [1], and when 50% of the variance is explained
by the common noise (i.e. σ˝ “ σ “ 0.064{?2 « 0.0453). The blue lines represent the optimal efforts in the case of
classical contracts, while the orange lines are dedicated to our new contracts.
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Figure 1: Comparison of efforts in the linear EVD case.
Parameters: σ˝ “ σ “ 0.064{?2 and RP “ 0.006 (upper graphs) or RP “ 0.02 (lower graphs).
• for RP “ 0.006 (upper graphs), thanks to the contract indexed on others, the Principal can incentivise the
consumers to make more effort on the drift and on the volatility (orange curves compared to blue ones), for the
entire duration of the contract.
• if the risk aversion of the Principal increases (RP “ 0.02, lower graphs), the consumer makes more efforts in the
beginning of the contract, and less after.
The fact that the efforts are decreasing in time can be explained as follows. At every moment t P r0, T s of the contract,
what matters to the Principal is rather the integral between 0 and t of the efforts than the instantaneous efforts. Indeed,
she cares about the deviation Xt for all t P r0, T s, which is defined by Xt “ ´
şt
0 αtdt `
şt
0 σ
?
βtdWt `
şt
0 σ
˝dWt˝ , and
the quadratic variation of XT given by xXyT “
şT
0
`
σ2βt `
`
σ˝
˘2˘dt. Therefore, it is in the Principal’s interest to ask
for more effort at the beginning of the contract. In order to assess the benefit of our new contrats on the efforts of the
consumers, we compute the following two quantities,
∆α‹ :“
şT
0
`
a‹pZ‹t q ´ a‹
`
Z0,‹t
˘˘
dtşT
0 a
‹`Z0,‹t ˘dt and ∆β‹ :“ ´
σ2
şT
0
`
b‹pΓ‹t q ´ b‹
`
Γ0,‹t
˘˘
dt
σ2
şT
0 b
‹`Γ0,‹t ˘dt` T `σ˝˘2
representing the relative gain respectively in mean and in volatility of the consumption between new and classical
contracts. More precisely, if ∆α‹ ě 0 (resp. ∆β‹ ě 0), the new contracts incentivise the consumers to decrease more
the mean (resp. the volatility) of their total consumption at the end of the contract (at time T ). The results are
presented in Figure 2. We choose values for RP of the same order than the estimation in [1]. For σ˝, we set values such
that pσ˝q2 “ x% of the total variance without effort (nominal variance), i.e. Σp1q` pσ˝q2 “ 0.0642. For example, when
σ˝ “ 0.064, then pσ˝q2 “ 100% of the nominal variance: this means that the volatility in the deviation consumption is
entirely related to climate hazards (σ “ 0).
Figure 2 show that, in most cases, our new contracts lead to a significant decrease in consumption on average and
on volatility compared to classical contracts. However, when the risk–aversion of the Principal increases, this gain
becomes negative. Nevertheless, it can be stressed that, on the one hand, for the parameters calibrated in [1], there is
a significant gain regardless of the correlation with the common noise. On the other hand, even if the Principal has a
relatively high risk–aversion, our new contracts allow a reduction on average and on volatility of the consumption if it
is strongly impacted by weather conditions. Therefore, our contracts can help to better manage consumption cut-off
during peak demand due to climate hazard.
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Figure 2: Relative gain in mean (left) and in volatility (right) of the consumption in the linear EVD case.
piiq Out of curiosity, we can also investigate the positive δ case. Using Remark 4.11, we can prove, analytically in
this case, that Z0,‹ ě Z‹ “ 0. On the one hand, since the payment rate on the drift is positive in both cases and
using Theorem 3.4, the effort of the consumer to reduce his consumption in average is zero. On the other hand, this
inequality leads to Γ0,‹ ď Γ‹ ď 0. Therefore, when the Principal offers classical contracts, she incentivises more the
consumers to make effort on the volatility. Nevertheless, since λ “ 3.3 ˆ 10´2 and θ “ 4 ˆ 10´4, we can remark that
the effort on the volatility will be zero, since
Γ0,‹t “ ´max
"
θ `RApZ0,‹t q2, 1λ
*
“ ´ 1
λ
,
and thus
β‹t pΓ0,‹t q “ 1^
`
λ
`
Γ0,‹t q´
˘´1{pηk`1q _Bmin “ 1.
Therefore, for small λ, both contracts lead to zero effort on the drift and on the volatility. To find a case where our
contracts induce less effort on the volatility than classical ones, we need to increase drastically λ for example. Figure
3 illustrates this particular case, with δ “ 5, λ “ 3.3 and when 50% of the variance is explained by the common noise
(σ˝ “ σ “ 0.064{?2).
Although this result does not seem intuitive, the explanation is as follows. When δ is positive, a reduction of the
consumption strongly decreases the consumers’ utility in comparison to the marginal gain on the producer’s utility.
Therefore, it is too costly for the Principal to incentivise the consumers to make efforts, in particular on the drift.
Thus, the Principal sets a non negative payment rate Z (upper left graph). However, since she is risk–averse, she wants
to share some risk with the consumers through the contract. In the classical contracts case, the only way to share risk
is through the infinitesimal payment Z0,‹t dXt. This explain why Z0,‹ is positive (upper left graph, blue curve), while,
in the new contracts case, the Principal can share the risk through the indexation on others by Zµ,‹, and can therefore
set Z‹ “ 0 (upper left graph, orange curve). Moreover, when the Principal offers a positive payment Z, she needs to
compensate by giving a negative payment Γ (upper right graph, blue curve), in order to minimise the payment indexed
on the quadratic variation pΓt ` RAZ2t qdxXyt. Otherwise, in the new contracts case, the Principal manages the risk
through the payment rate Zµ, and does not need to compensate with a small (negative) Γ (upper right graph, orange
curve).
We may think that the previous results are disappointing, because consumers make less effort to reduce the volatility
of their consumption (lower right graph). But as mentioned above, we insist on the fact that this case is not supposed
to happen, since, according to calibration in [1], λ “ 3.3ˆ 10´2 and δ “ ´55.44 ď 0.
Comparison of utility. We can prove analytically that the utility of the Principal is bigger in the case she can
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Figure 3: Comparison of payment rates and efforts in the linear EVD case with δ ě 0.
Parameters: δ “ 5, λ “ 3.3 and σ˝ “ σ “ 0.064{?2.
indexed contracts on others’ deviation consumption. Indeed, we have
m0,P ptq “ θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12ρδ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPRhP pt, zq
ě θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12ρδ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPRhpt, zq ` 12`σ˝˘2 infzPR!RAz2 `RP p´z ` δpT ´ tqq2).
The second infimum is attained on z “ RP δpT ´ tq{pRA `RP q, which leads to
m0,P ptq ě θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ` 12´`σ˝˘2R´ ρ¯δ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPRhpt, zq “ mP ptq.
Hence, for all t P r0, T s we have m0,P ptq ě mP ptq, and thus V P0 ě V 0,P0 . This result is very intuitive since in the case
of new contracts, the Principal has more controls to maximise her utility (three instead of two).
In order to assure convergence when RP tends to zero, we draw in Figure 4 the utility difference defined as follow
∆V “ 1` V
P
0
RP
´ 1` V
0,P
0
RP
“ 1
RP
`
V P0 ´ V 0,P0
˘
,
since
lim
RPÑ0
1` V P0
RP
“ lim
RPÑ0
1´ eRP pξ0´uP p0,µX0 qq
RP
“ ´ξ0 ` u0p0, µX0 q “ V 00 .
We study the effect of the risk–aversion parameter RP on the producer’s utility, and also the impact of the percentage
of variance related to common noise.
First of all, notice that the utility difference is of order 10´1, as the utility itself. Therefore, we have a significant
gain by implementing this type of contracts, which is confirmed by Figure 5, representing the relative utility difference,
computed as:
∆V “
1` V P0
RP
´ 1` V
0,P
0
RP
1` V 0,P0
RP
“ V
P
0 ´ V 0,P0
1` V 0,P0
.
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Figure 4: Absolute utility difference in the linear EVD case.
Variation with respect to the risk aversion parameter RP and the correlation with the common noise σ˝.
Moreover, it is clear that the more significant the correlation with the common noise is, the more important the utility
difference is. This is an expected result, since our type of contracts allows the Principal to better choose the remaining
risk she wants to bear, by indexing the contract on others. We have already noticed that, in absence of common noise
(σ˝ “ 0), our contracts are reduced to classical contracts for drift and volatility control.
Figure 4 shows also that the gain in utility is decreasing with the risk–aversion of the Principal. Indeed, with classical
contracts, she is forced to give to the consumers some risk through the linear payment ZtdXt. Since the consumers
are risk–averse too, this payment must be compensated by a deterministic one. Our new contracts allows her to better
choose the risk she wants to bear. On the one hand, if her risk–aversion is low, she can keep all the risk to herself.
Thus, she does not need to compensate the risk with a deterministic payment, and therefore she make a significant
gain. On the other hand, if she is risk–averse, she adds a random part to the contract, indexed on the common noise:
RP
RA `RP σ
˝δ
ż t
0
pT ´ sqdWs˝ .
But, since the consumers are risk–averse too, this random payment must be compensated by its quadratic variation:
1
2
RAR
2
P
pRA `RP q2
`
σ˝
˘2
δ2
ż t
0
`
T ´ s˘2ds,
Therefore, the more risk–averse the Principal is, the more costly it is for her to spread the risk.
5.3 Risk–neutral Principal
If the Principal is risk–neutral, we expect a solution of the form
v0,0pt, µYt q “ ´Eµ
L
t
”
Lζ
0
t
ı
` u0,0pt, µXt q. (5.4)
It can be formally proved that the results of the previous section hold with RP “ 0. In particular, u0,0 is solution to
the PDE (5.3) with RP “ 0, and we can also state the equivalent of the proposition 5.1 with RP “ 0 in this case. But,
in order to obtain closed–form solution, we focus on the case of the linear energy value discrepancy.
Proposition 5.4 (Proposition 5.3 with RP “ 0). Let the energy value discrepancy be linear, i.e. pf ´ gqpxq “ δx,
x P R. Then
piq the producer’s value function is given by V 0,00 “ ´ξ0 ` u0,0p0, µX0 q where the certainty equivalent function u0,0 is
characterised by
u0,0pt, µXt q “ δpT ´ tq
ż
xµXt pdxq ´
ż T
t
m0,0psqds, where m0,0ptq :“ θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12ρδ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPRh0pt, zq,
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Figure 5: Relative utility difference in the linear EVD case.
Variation with respect to the risk aversion parameter RP and the correlation with the common noise σ˝.
piiq the optimal payment rate process ζ0,‹ “ pZ0,‹,Γ0,‹q is a deterministic function of time given by
Z0,‹t “ Arg min
zPR h
0pt, zq and Γ0,‹t “ ´max
"
θ `RApZ0,‹t q2, 1
λ
*
.
Let us compare this Proposition with the Proposition 4.10.
Comparison of efforts. As previously, we need to distinguish between cases according to positive or negative δ.
piq On the one hand, in the meaningful case, when δ ď 0, the efforts of the consumers are higher when the Principal
can indexed contracts on other’s deviation. In fact, let us recall the optimal payment rates Z in the two cases:
Z0,‹t “ Arg min
zPR
!
F0ph`RAz2q `RA
`
σ˝
˘2
z2 ` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tq˘2) ď 0,
and Z‹t “ Arg min
zPR
!
F0ph`RAz2q ` ρ
`pz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tq˘2) ď 0.
By definition of the minimum, we have:
F0
`
θ `RA
`
Z0,‹t
˘2˘`RA`σ˝˘2`Z0,‹t ˘2 ` ρ```Z0,‹t ˘´ ^Amax˘` δpT ´ tq˘2
ď F0pθ `RAz2q `RA
`
σ˝
˘2
z2 ` ρppz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tqq2,
for all z, and in particular for z “ Z‹t . In the same way,
F0
`
θ `RA
`
Z‹t
˘2˘` ρ``Z‹t ˘´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tq˘2 ď F0ph`RAz2q ` ρppz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tqq2,
for all z and in particular for z “ Z0,‹t . Hence, using the first and then the second inequality we have
RA
`
σ˝
˘2´`
Z0,‹t
˘2 ´ `Z‹t ˘2¯ ď F0´θ `RA`Z‹t ˘2¯´ F0´θ `RA`Z0,‹t ˘2¯
` ρ
´`
Z‹t
˘´ ^Amax ` δpT ´ tq¯2 ´ ρ´`Z0,‹t ˘´ ^Amax ` δpT ´ tq¯2 ď 0.
Hence RA
`
σ˝
˘2`
Z0,‹t ´ Z‹t
˘`
Z0,‹t ` Z‹t
˘ ď 0, and since Z0,‹t , Z‹t ď 0, we obtain 0 ě Z0,‹t ě Z‹t . Therefore, in the
case where the Principal can index contracts on the deviation consumption of others, the efforts of the consumer to
reduce his deviation consumption in average is more important. Moreover, the inequality on the optimal payment rate
Z implies that 0 ě Γ0,‹t ě Γ‹: the effort on the volatility is also more important. These results are presented in Figure
6 for pσ˝q2 “ 50%, i.e. 50% of the variance is explained by the common noise.
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Figure 6: Comparison of efforts in the linear EVD case for a risk–neutral Principal.
piiq On the other hand, if δ ě 0, we obtain Z‹ “ 0 in both cases, which leads to zero effort from the consumers on their
deviation consumption in average. Moreover, the optimal payment rate Γ‹ is also the same in both cases and leads to
the same effort on the volatility. Therefore, in this particular case, the choice of new or classical contracts does not
affect the consumers efforts.
Comparison of utility. The utility of a risk–neutral Principal is higher when she can index contracts on others’
deviation consumption. Indeed,
m0,0ptq “ θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12ρδ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPR!F0ph`RAz2q `RA`σ˝˘2z2 ` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tq˘2)
ě θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12ρδ2pT ´ tq2 ` 12 infzPR!F0ph`RAz2q ` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` δpT ´ tq˘2) “ m0ptq.
Hence, for all t P r0, T s we have m0,0ptq ě m0ptq, which leads to
´
ż T
t
m0,0psqds ď ´
ż T
t
m0psqds,
and we conclude that V 00 ě V 0,00 . This result is shown in Figure 7. The absolute utility difference and the relative
utility difference are increasing with respect to the correlation with the common noise, which is consistent with the
intuition that the contract allows the Principal to manage the remaining risk. The more important this risk is, the
more gain in utility the Principal receives.
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Figure 7: Absolute and relative utility difference in the linear EVD case for a risk–neutral Principal.
Variation with respect to the correlation with the common noise σ˝.
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To conclude this section, considering linear EVD, there is a net benefice from implementing contracts with indexation
on others’ deviation consumption. In addition to the substantial gain in utility for the Principal, this type of contracts
induces, in general, more efforts of the consumers to reduce their consumption in average and with less volatility. The
best results are obtained for a risk–neutral producer. In this case, if the variance of the deviation is only explained
by the common noise, the utility with new contracts is up to 1.8 the utility with classical contracts (see Figure 7).
Moreover, Figure 2 (left) shows that consumers reduce their consumption by 1.8 times more on average. The best results
on volatility is when the volatility is half explained by the common noise, i.e. for σ˝ “ 0.064{?2. The consumers thus
increase their efforts on the volatility by almost 6.5%.
6 Extension and first–best
6.1 Contractible common noise
Throughout this paper, we have studied optimal contracting in the case where the Principal can not offer a contract
directly indexed on the common noise. The goal of this section is to define an optimal form of contract in the case of
a contractible common noise, and compare the results to those obtained in the previous case. In Section 3, we were
looking at the optimal form of contracts for the representative consumer in the case the Principal can only index the
contract on his deviation consumption and the conditional law of others. The Remark 3.3 leads us to also study the
class of contracts one can obtain if the Principal is able to index the contract on it. From (2.6), we recall that, in this
case, the Principal is offering a contract Fobs,˝´measurable.
Therefore, we expect that the value function of the consumer now depends on three state variables: X, pµ and W ˝. We
consider the dynamic version of the value function of the representative consumer, V At , which may be written as
V At “ vA
`
t,Xt^¨,Wt˝^¨, pµt˘.
If the function vA : r0, T s ˆ Cpr0, T s,R2q ˆ PT pRq is smooth enough in the sense defined in [7, Section 4.3.4], we can
apply the Chain Rule with Common Noise under C1,2,2´Regularity, defined in [7, Theorem 4.17] to vA. Following the
same reasoning as the one developed in the Subsection 3.2.1, and using the computations in Remark 3.3, we obtain the
following form of contract, indexed by the triple ζ˝ “ pZ,Z˝,Γq,
ξt “ ξ0 ´
ż t
0
H˝pXs, ζs˝ qds`
ż t
0
ZsdXs ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RAZ2s
˘
dxXys ` σ˝
ż t
0
Zs˝dWs˝ ` 12RA
`
σ˝
˘2 ż t
0
Zs˝
`
2Zs ` Zs˝
˘2ds.
(6.1)
Therefore, if the Principal observes the common noise, it is equivalent to index the contract on the law of others or on
the common noise. Indeed, the form of contract we obtain here is the same as the one in Remark 3.3. This contracts
leads obviously to the same effort of the consumers and to a unique mean–field equilibrium. If we compare both
cases where the Principal observes or not the common noise, the only difference is the measurability of the contract’s
parameters. In fact, the optimal form of contract is the same whether the Principal observes or not the common noise.
Of course, the form of the contract is more explicit in this case, and we don’t need the indexation on the law of others,
but the only change is that the control ζ˝ of the Principal here is predictable with respect to a bigger filtration Fobs,˝.
To sum up, if the Principal does not observe the common noise, Fobs is the natural filtration generated by X and pµ,
thus ζ is Fobs´measurable and the optimal form of contract is given by (3.7). If the Principal observes the common
noise, Fobs,˝ is the natural filtration generated by X, pµ and W ˝, thus ζ is Fobs,˝´measurable and the optimal form of
contract is given by (6.1). In this case, indexing the contract on pµ or W ˝ is equivalent. In both cases, the contract
form is the same, but we are allowed or not to write it in term of the common noise.
If the Principal observes the common noise, she might have an interest to offer contracts indexed on it. However,
intuitively, in the linear energy discrepancy case, since the optimal compensation rates for the contract are deterministic,
the Principal should not gain from indexing the contract on the common noise. The optimisation problem of the
Principal is the same as before, except that the supremum is taken over contracts ξ P Ξ˝. In fact, following the same
reasoning as in Section 4, Theorem 4.5 and the propositions 4.6, 4.8 and 4.10 can be established in this case. Therefore,
there is no benefice for indexing the contract on the common noise, if there is already an indexation on the law of
others. This means that our contracts indexed on the law of others allow the Principal to index the compensation on
the common noise in a hidden way.
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6.2 First–best problem
In this section, we concentrate our attention to the so-called first-best framework, where there is no moral hazard and
the Principal can actually choose directly both the contract ξ as well as the actions of the Agents.
Given the reservation utility level of the representative Agent, R0, the problem of the Principal is
V FB0 :“ inf
ρą0
!
´ ρR0 ` sup
pP,µXqPPˆPT pRq
sup
ξPΞFB
 
JP0 pξ,Pq ` ρJA0 pξ, µX ,Pq
()
,
where ρ ą 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the participation constraint, and ΞFB is defined by (C.1). Recall
that the representative Agent is risk–averse, with a risk–aversion parameter RA. We can consider both the cases of a
risk–averse or risk–neutral Principal. We give the results below, then we provide the proofs in Appendix C.
6.2.1 Principal with CARA utility
If the utility of the Principal is defined as UP pxq “ ´e´RP x, using the same tools as in Section 4, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. In the first–best case, for a risk–averse producer with a CARA utility function
piq the utility of the producer is given by
V FB0 “ R0
ˆ
V R0
R0
˙1`RPRA
, where V R0 “ ´e´R u
FBp0,µX0 q
and uFB solves the following HJB equation
BtuFB “ `
ż
pg ´ fqpxqµXpdxq ` θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ´ 12`σ˝˘2uFBx,µX ` 12`σ˝˘2R `uFBµX ˘2 ´ 12`σ˝˘2uFBµXµX
` ρuFBµX
``
uFBµX
˘´ ^Amax˘` 12c‹α`uFBµX ˘´ 12`uFBx,µX ´ θ˘Σ‹`uFBx,µX ´ θ˘` 12c‹β`uFBx,µX ´ θ˘,
upT, ¨q “ ´1;
piiq the optimal effort is the process νFB,‹ :“ pαFB,‹, βFB,‹q defined for all t P r0, T s by αFB,‹t :“ aFB,‹
`
t, µXt
˘
and
βFB,‹t :“ bFB,‹
`
t, µXt
˘
where, for k “ 1, . . . , d,
ak,FB,‹pt, µq :“ ρk``uFBµX pt, µq˘´ ^Amax˘ and bk,FB,‹ :“ 1^ `λk`uFBx,µX pt, µq ´ θ˘´˘ ´1ηk`1 _Bmin;
piiiq the optimal contract is given by
ξ‹ “ ´ 1
RA
lnp´R0q `
ż T
0
`
c
`
νFB,‹s
˘´ fpXsq˘ds;
pivq in the linear energy discrepancy case, uFB is of the form
uFB
`
t, µXt
˘ “ δpT ´ tq ż xµXt pdxq ´ ż T
t
mP psqds,
where
mP ptq “ θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ` 12´`σ˝˘2R´ ρ¯δ2pT ´ tq2 ` ρ2`δ´pT ´ tq ^Amax ` δpT ´ tq˘2 ` θ2Σ‹`´ θ˘` 12c‹β`´ θ˘,
and the functions defining optimal efforts are deterministic functions of time:
ak,FB,‹ptq :“ ρk``δpT ´ tq˘´ ^Amax˘ and bk,FB,‹ptq :“ 1^ `λkθ˘ ´1ηk`1 _Bmin, for k “ 1, . . . , d.
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6.2.2 Risk–neutral Principal
The risk–neutral Principal problem is very similar to the risk–averse one, informally the following Proposition is obtained
by setting RP “ 0 (and thus R “ 0) in Proposition 6.1
Proposition 6.2. In the first–best case, for a risk–neutral producer,
piq her utility is given by
V FB0 “ 1RA lnp´R0q ` V
0p0, µX0 q,
where V 0 is solution to the following HJB equation
0 “ BtV 0 `
ż
pf ´ gqpxqµXpdxq ´ θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ` 12`σ˝˘2V 0x,µX ` 12`σ˝˘2V 0µX ,µX
´ ρV 0µX
``
V
0
µX
˘´ ^Amax˘´ 12c‹α`V 0µX ˘` 12`V 0x,µX ´ θ˘Σ‹`V 0x,µX ´ θ˘´ 12c‹β`V 0x,µX ´ θ˘;
piiq in the linear energy discrepancy case, V 0 is of the form
V 0pt, µXt q “ δpT ´ tq
ż
xµXt pdxq ´
ż T
t
m0psqds,
where m0 is equal to mP for R “ 0, and the functions defining optimal efforts are the same deterministic functions of
time as in the risk–averse case.
7 Conclusion
We extend in this paper the problem of demand response contracts in electricity markets set in [1] by considering a
mean–field of consumers, whose consumption is impacted by a common noise. We proved that the producer can benefit
from considering the mean–field of consumers by indexing contracts on the consumption of one Agent and the law of
others. This new type of contracts allows the Principal to reward a consumer who makes more effort than the others,
or to penalise him if he makes less effort. At least in the linear energy value discrepancy case, the producer’s utility
is increased by the use of new contracts, and in most cases these contracts induce more efforts from the consumers to
reduce the average level of their consumption and with less volatility.
The optimal contract is indexed in a hidden way on the consumption adjusted for climate hazards. This allows the
Principal to offer a compensation indexed on the process which is really controlled by the consumer, to encourage him
for making effort on the drift and the volatility of his deviation. Moreover, if the Principal is risk-averse, she can add
to this contract a part indexed on others, which is in fact an indexation on the common noise, to better choose the
remaining risk she wants to bear.
In the case where the principal is authorised to index the contract directly to the common noise, we obtain the same
form of contracts. Therefore, contracting on the conditional law of others or on common noise is strictly equivalent.
Nevertheless, if the Principal could not observe the common noise, or if there exist some regulatory rules preventing
her from using the common noise directly in the contract, indexing the contract on others is a way to overcome this.
Our approach provides better management of the risk associated with common noise. Thus, the greater the variance
explained by the common noise, the more significant the results are. Therefore, these new contracts could improve
demand response during periods where consumption is strongly affected by weather conditions, for example in winter,
when the risk of electricity blackouts is high, and thus demand response is more than needed. Naturally, in the absence
of common noise, our contracts are reduced to classical contracts for drift and volatility control.
A Technical proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Let P P P. First of all, by definition of P we have PrΛ P U0s “ 1, thus Λpds,dvq “ δνPs pdvqds P´a.s. for some
F´predictable control process νP :“ `αP, βP˘. Therefore, pX,W,W ˝q is an Ito¯ process with drift ApνPq and quadratic
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variation B
`
νPt
˘
BJ
`
νPt
˘
under P, where
B
`
νPt
˘
BJ
`
νPt
˘ “
¨˝
ΣpβPt q `
`
σ˝
˘2
σJpβPt q σ˝
σpβPt q Id 0d
σ˝ 0Jd 1
‚˛“
¨˝
0 σJpβPt q σ˝
0d Id 0d
0 0Jd 1
‚˛ˆ
¨˝
0 0Jd 0
σpβPt q Id 0Jd
σ˝ 0Jd 1,
‚˛, dtb Ppdωq ´ a.e.
Furthermore, following the line of [26], we consider the extended space Ωe “ Ω ˆ Ω1 where Ω1 “ Cpr0, T s,Rd`2q. Ω1
is equipped with the filtration pF 1tqtě0, generated by the canonical process, and P10 is the Wiener measure on Ω1. We
define Fet :“ Ft b F 1t, Fe :“ F b F1 and Pe :“ P b P10. We denote Xe, W e and W ˝,e the natural extensions of W and
W ˝ from Ω to Ωe. By [36, Theorem 4.5.2], there is a d` 2´dimensional Brownian motion Be on pΩe,Fe,Peq, such that
d
¨˝
Xet
W et
W ˝,et
‚˛“
¨˝´αPt ¨ 1d
0d
0
‚˛dt`
¨˝
0 σJpβPt q σ˝
0d Id 0d
0 0Jd 1
‚˛dBet .
Therefore, we have dW et “ d
`
Be,2t , . . . , B
e,d`1
t
˘J and dW ˝,et “ dBe,d`2t . Then,
Xet “ ´
ż t
0
αPs ¨ 1dds`
ż t
0
`
0, σJpβPs q, σ˝
˘
dBes “ ´
ż t
0
αPs ¨ 1dds`
ż t
0
σpβPs q ¨ dW es `
ż t
0
σ˝dW ˝,es ,
for t ě 0, Pe´a.s., which implies the desired result.
A.2 Another representation for the set of measures
The general approach to moral hazard problems in [12] requires to distinguish between the efforts of the agent which
give rise to absolutely continuous probability measures in P, namely the ones for which only the drift changes, or for
which the volatility control changes while keeping fixed the quadratic variation of X. The goal of this subsection is to
provide the appropriate formulation in our setting. Let us start by introducing some notations.
We let P be the set of probability measures P on pΩ,FT q such that
(i) the canonical vector process pX,W,W ˝qJ is an pF,Pq´local martingale for which there exists an F´predictable
and B´valued process βP such that the P´quadratic variation of pX,W,W ˝qJ is P´a.s. equal to¨˚
˝Σ
`
βPs
˘` `σ˝˘2 σJ`βPs ˘ σ˝
σ
`
βPs
˘
Id 0d
σ˝ 0Jd 1
‹˛‚, s P r0, T s;
(ii) P
“
Λ P U0s “ 1.
Arguing as in Lemma 2.2, we know that for all P P P
Xt “ X0 `
ż t
0
σ
`
βPs q ¨ dWs `
ż t
0
σ˝dWs˝ , t P r0, T s, P´ a.s.
For any A´valued and F´predictable process α, any P P P, and F´predictable and B´valued process β7 such that,
P´a.s., Σ`βP˘ “ Σ`β˘, we define the equivalent measures Pα,β by their Radon–Nykodym density on FT
dPα,β
dP
:“ exp
ˆ
´
ż T
0
αs ¨ 1d
Σpβsq σ
`
βs
˘ ¨ dWs ´ 12
ż T
0
pαs ¨ 1dq2ds
˙
.
Notice that such a measure is well–defined since A is a compact set, and the B´valued processes are automatically
bounded and bounded away from 0. It is then immediate to check that the P coincides exactly with the set of all
probability measures of the form Pα,β , which satisfy in addition
7Strictly speaking, the process β should be indexed by the measure P, but we chose to not do so in order to alleviate notations.
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(i) Pα,β ˝ pX0q´1 “ %, and there exists a measure ι on Rd ˆ R such that Pα,β ˝
`pW0,W0˝ q˘´1 “ ι ;
(ii) for P´a.e. ω P Ω and for every t P r0, T s, we have
µtpωq “
`
Pα,β
˘ω
t
˝ pXt^¨q´1.
(iii) pW ˝, µq is Pα,β´independent of W .
For any P P P, we denote by UpPq the set of controls pα, βq P U such that Pα,β P P.
A.3 Best–reaction functions of the consumers and equilibrium
In this Subsection, we wish to relate the best–reaction function of a consumer to a given contract ξ P Ξ, and a given
measure pµ played by the mean–field of the other consumers, in other words V A0 pξ, pµq, to an appropriate second–order
BSDE.
Define the process S0, taking values in the set of symmetric positive 2ˆ 2 matrices, defined by
S0t :“
ˆ
St `
`
σ˝
˘2
σ˝
σ˝ 1
˙
, t P r0, T s.
We will also need, for any p ě 1, the following norms,
}Z}pHp :“ sup
PPP
EP
„ˆż T
0
ZJt S0tZtdt
˙ p
2

, and }Y }pSp :“ sup
PPP
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
|Yt|p

,
defined for any Fobs´predictable, R2´valued process Z and any Fobs´optional, R´valued process Y with càdlàg paths.
We consider the following so–called second–order BSDE (2BSDE for short)
Yt “ ´e´RAξ `
ż T
t
F pXs, Ys, Z1s , Ssqds´
ż T
t
Z1sdXs ´ σ˝
ż T
t
Z2sdWs˝ `
ż T
t
dKs, (A.1)
The following definition recalls the notion of 2BSDE, and uses the additional notation
PtpP, pFobsq`q :“
!
P1 P P : PrEs “ P1rEs for all E P pFobst q`
)
, for any pP, tq P P ˆ r0, T s.
Definition A.1. We say that pY, Z,Kq is a solution to the 2BSDE (A.1) if for some k ą 1
piq Y is a càdlàg and an pFobsqP`´optional process, and }Y }Sk ă `8.
piiq Z “ pZ1, Z2qJ is an pFobsqP´predictable R2´valued process with ››Z››Hk ă `8.
piiiq K is an pFobsqP´optional, càdlàg, non–decreasing, K0 “ 0, sup
PPP
EPrKkT s ă `8, and satisfies the minimality
condition
Kt “ essinfP
P1PPtpP,F`q
EP
1”
KT
ˇˇˇ
pFobst qP`
ı
, 0 ď t ď T, P´ a.s. for all P P P. (A.2)
The main result of this section relates the solution to the above 2BSDE to the best–reaction function of the Agent.
Proposition A.2. Fix pξ, pµq P Ξˆ PT pRq. Let pY, pZ1, Z2qJ,Kq be a solution to the 2BSDE (A.1). We have
V A0 pξ, pµq “ sup
PPP
EPrY0s.
Conversely, the pdynamicq value function V At pξ, pµq always provides the first component of a solution to (A.1). Moreover,
any optimal effort ν‹ :“ pαP‹ , βP‹q, and the optimal measure P‹ must be such that
K “ 0, `P‹˘ν‹ ´ a.s., `α‹t , β‹t ˘ P argmaxpa,bqPAˆΣ´1pStq F pXt^¨, Yt, Z1t , Stq, `P‹˘ν
‹ ´ a.s.
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Proof. The proof is classical and follows the lines of [12, Proposition 4.6]. We thus only mention here why the required
assumptions are satisfied. First of all, the map F can readily be rewritten as a function rF px, y, pS0q1{2pz1, z2qJ, S0q
as in [33], since the matrix S0 is always invertible in our setting. Moreover, we can easily get rid off the linear term
´RAfpxqy in F by considering the 2BSDE satisfied by e´
şt
0 fpXs^¨qdsYt instead. We therefore assume without loss
of generality that f is 0 here. Then, rF and the terminal condition ´e´RAξ satisfy the Lipschitz and integrability
properties in [33, Assumption 1.1 piq and piiq], because controls are bounded and by definition of the set of contracts,
recall (2.5) (and that the densities from probabilities in P to probabilities in P have moments of any order, uniformly
on the measures). [33, Assumption 4.1] is also automatically satisfied as rF is 0 for y “ z1 “ z2 “ 0.
Next, [33, Assumption 1.1 piiiq–pvq] are also satisfied by the set of measures P, see for instance [31]. Finally, the set P
is saturated in the sense of [33, Definition 5.1], see [33, Remark 5.1].
With Proposition A.2 in hand, we can now characterise mean–field equilibria thanks to a 2BSDE of mean–field type,
reminiscent of the mean–field BSDE obtained in the setting of [16] where only the drift of X was controlled.
Theorem A.3. The pair pP‹, µ‹q belongs toM‹pξq if and only if P‹ “ P ν‹ where ν‹ :“ pαP‹ , βP‹q is such that
K‹ “ 0, `P‹˘ν‹ ´ a.s., `α‹t , β‹t ˘ P argmaxpa,bqPAˆΣ´1pStq F pXt^¨, Y ‹t , Z1‹t , Stq, `P‹˘ν
‹ ´ a.s.,
where pY ‹, pZ1‹, Z2‹qJ,K‹q is a solution to the mean–field 2BSDE
Y ‹t “ ´e´RAξ `
ż T
t
F pXs, Y ‹s , Z1‹s , Ssqds´
ż T
t
Z1‹s dXs ´ σ˝
ż T
t
Z2‹s dWs˝ `
ż T
t
dK‹s , (A.3)
which satisfies Definition A.1 and the fixed–point constraint
µtpωq “
`
Pα,β
˘ω
t
˝ pXt^¨q´1.
Proof. By Proposition A.2, we have a characterisation of the best–reaction function of the Agent to an arbitrary pµ. An
equilibrium then necessitates only that pµ coincides with the conditional distribution of X under P‹, which is exactly
what is given by the mean–field 2BSDE (A.3).
We end this section with the following lemma which provides us with explicit integrability properties for the processes
Z and Zµ associated to a contract in ΞS. This will prove useful for us when analysing the problem of the Principal.
Lemma A.4. For any pZ,Zµ,Γq P V, there exists some p1 P p1, pq such that
sup
PPP
EP
„ˆż T
0
|Zs|2ds
˙p1{2
` sup
PPP
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
Z
µ
s
ˇˇ2ds˙p1{2 ă `8.
Proof. First, we know by Theorem 3.4 and its proof that if we define
Yt :“ ´e´RAξ
ξ0,ζ
t , Z1t :“ ´RAYtZt, Z2t :“ ´RAYtZµt , Γt :“ ´RAYtΓt, t P r0, T s,
Kt :“
ż t
0
ˆ
´RAYsH˝pXs, ζsq ´ 12Γs
´
Ss `
`
σ˝
˘2¯´ F pXs, Ys, Z1s , Ssq˙ds, t P r0, T s,
then pY, pZ1, Z2qJ,Kq solves 2BSDE A.1 and in particular that there is some p¯ P p1, pq such that pZ1, Z2qJ P Hp¯.
Furthermore, we also have that ˇˇˇˇ
1
Yt
ˇˇˇˇ
“ eRAξξ0,ζt ,
so that we deduce using Hölder’s inequality, the definition of ΞS, and the fact that densities between measures in P
and P have moments of any order
sup
PPP
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ
1
Yt
ˇˇˇˇp
ă `8.
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Then, we have for any p˜ P p1, p¯q
sup
PPP
EP
„ˆż T
0
|Zs|2ds
˙p˜{2
“ 1
Rp˜A
sup
PPP
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇˇˇ
Z1s
Ys
ˇˇˇˇ2
ds
˙p˜{2
ď 1
Rp˜A
sup
PPP
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ
1
Yt
ˇˇˇˇp˜ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
Z1s
ˇˇ2ds˙p˜{2
ď 1
Rp˜A
sup
PPP
ˆ
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ
1
Yt
ˇˇˇˇp˙ p˜p
sup
PPP
ˆ
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
Z1s
ˇˇ2ds˙ pp˜2pp´p˜q ˙1´p˜{p
To conclude, we want to make sure that we can choose p˜ P p1, p¯q such that pp˜{pp ´ p˜q P p1, p¯s. This is equivalent to
having $’&’%
p˜ ą p1` p
p˜ ď pp¯
p` p¯ ,
which is always possible since pp¯{pp` p¯q ą p{p1` pq ðñ p¯pp´ 1q ą 0. The same reasoning gives us the required result
for Zµ.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Before explaining how to prove the aforementioned result, notice that the second equality in Theorem 4.1 is trivial.
Indeed, in absence of limited liability, the value of the Principal is a non–increasing function of the utility obtained by
the Agent. Mathematically, this translates into the fact that the dynamics of both state variables in the Principal’s
problem actually do not depend on L, so that the dependence on the associated initial value is straightforward.
The proof of the first equality relies on arguments similar to the ones developed in [12], [16] and [1]. Using Proposition
A.2 and Theorem A.3, we know that for ξ P Ξ, we have that there exists an equilibrium pP‹, µ‹q PM‹pξq, where P‹ is
such that for P‹´a.e. ω P Ω and for every t P r0, T s, we have
µ‹t pωq “ pP‹qωt ˝ pXt^¨q´1,
and
K “ 0, `P‹˘ν‹ ´ a.s., `α‹t , β‹t ˘ P argmaxpa,bqPAˆΣ´1pStq F pXt^¨, Yt, Z1t , Stq, `P‹˘ν
‹ ´ a.s.,
where K is the last component of the solution pY, pZ1, Z2qJ,Kq of the 2BSDE
Yt “ ´e´RAξ `
ż T
t
F pXs, Ys, Z1s , Ssqds´
ż T
t
Z1sdXs ´ σ˝
ż T
t
Z2sdWs˝ `
ż T
t
dKs.
The main difference between contracts in Ξ and ΞS comes from whether the process K above is absolutely continuous
with respect to Lebesgue measure or not. Since it is not in general, we will approximate it by a sequence of absolutely
continuous ones. Fix thus some ε ą 0, and define the absolutely continuous approximation of K
Kεt :“ 1ε
ż t
pt´εq`
Ksds, t P r0, T s.
Clearly, Kε is FP´predictable, non–decreasing P´q.s. and
Kε “ 0, P‹ ´ a.s. for all pP‹, µ‹q PM‹pξq. (A.4)
We next define for any t P r0, T s the process
Y εt :“ Y0 ´
ż t
0
F pXs, Y εs , Z1s , Ssqds`
ż t
0
Z1sdXs ` σ˝
ż t
0
Z2sdWs˝ ´
ż t
0
dKεs , (A.5)
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and verify that pY ε, pZ1, Z2q,Kεq solves the 2BSDE with terminal condition ´e´RAξε :“ Y εT and generator F . Indeed,
since Kε ď K, Kε does satisfy the required minimality condition, which is obvious by (A.4). We also verify that
supPPP EP
“|e´RAξε |p‰ ă 8. Thus, by [33, Theorem 4.4], we have the estimates
}Y ε}Sp¯ `
››pZ1, Z2qJ››Hp¯ ă 8, for p¯ P p1, pq. (A.6)
We finally observe that a probability measure P satisfies K “ 0, P´a.s. if and only if it satisfies Kε “ 0, P´a.s. Notice
then that for any pt, ω, x, y, z1, z2q P r0, T s ˆ Ωˆ R4, the map
γ ÞÝÑ ´RAyH˝
ˆ
x,´ 1
RAy
pz1, z2, γq
˙
´ 12γ
´
Sspωq `
`
σ˝
˘2¯´ F px, y, z1, Sspωqq is surjective on p0,8q. (A.7)
Indeed, it is non–negative, by definition of H˝ and F , convex, continuous on the interior of its domain, and is coercive
by the boundedness of the controls.
Let 9Kε denote the density of the absolutely continuous process Kε with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Applying
a classical measurable selection argument (the maps appearing here are continuous, and we can use the results from
[3, 4]), we may deduce the existence of an Fobs´predictable process Γε such that
9Kεs “ ´RAY εs H˝
ˆ
Xs,´ 1
RAY εs
pZ1s , Z2s ,Γεsq
˙
´ 12Γ
ε
s
´
Ss `
`
σ˝
˘2¯´ F pXs, Y εs , Z1s , Ssq.
For 9Kεs ą 0, this is clear from (A.7), and if 9Kεs “ 0, Γεs can be chosen arbitrarily. Substituting in (A.5), it follows that
the following representation for Y ε holds
Y εt “ Y0 `
ż t
0
RAY
ε
s H˝
ˆ
Xs,´ 1
RAY εs
pZ1s , Z2s ,Γεsq
˙
ds`
ż t
0
Z1sdXs ` σ˝
ż t
0
Z2sdWs˝ ` 12
ż t
0
ΓεsdxXys.
Applying Ito¯’s formula to ´1{RA logp´Y εt q,
ξεt “´ 1RA logp´Y
ε
0 q ´
ż t
0
H˝pXs, ζsqds`
ż t
0
ZsdXs ` σ˝
ż t
0
Z
µ
sdWs˝ ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RA|Zs|2
˘
dxXys
` 12RA
`
σ˝
˘2 ż t
0
Z
µ
s
`
Z
µ
s ` 2Zs
˘
ds.
where
ζ :“ pZ,Zµ,Γq “ ´ 1
RAY ε
pZ1, Z2,Γεq.
Define Zµ to be any Fobs´predictable process, taking values in L, such that pEµ‹s rZµs p pXs^¨qs “ Zµs . Using the dynamic
of pX, we deduce that
ξεt :“ ´ 1RA logp´Y
ε
0 q ´
ż t
0
HpXs, pµs, ζs, α‹sqds` ż t
0
ZsdXs ` 12
ż t
0
`
Γs `RAZ2s
˘
dxXys `
ż t
0
pEµ‹s“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘d pXs‰
` 12RA
ż t
0
pEµ‹sqEµ‹s“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘Zµs ` qXs^¨˘d@ pX, qXDs‰`RA ż t
0
ZspEµ‹s“Zµs ` pXs^¨˘d@X, pXDs‰, t P r0, T s,
where ζ :“ pZ,Zµ,Γq. This shows that the contract ξε has the required dynamics (3.7), since, at equilibrium, µ‹ “ pµ
and the effort α‹ “ pα‹ and is unique. The fact that it belongs to ΞS then stems from (A.6) and arguments similar
to those in Lemma A.4. We can then conclude, in view of Appendix A.2 and as in the proof of [12, Theorem 3.6] by
noting that ξε “ ξ, P‹´a.s.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Let v be a solution to the PDE (4.2), smooth enough in the sense of Definition 4.3, such that the condition (4.4) is
satisfied. Moreover, assume that the supremum in the PDE (4.2) is attained for a function v‹, from r0, T s ˆ PpR2q to
R3. We need to prove that V P0 “ vp0, µY0 q.
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Applying the Chain Rule under C1,2´Regularity on v, as a function depending on time and on the conditional law µY
of Y ζ “ pX,LζqJ, we obtain:
dvpt, µYt q “
ˆ
Btvpt, µYt q `
ż
BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qpg ´ fqpxqµYt pdx, d`q ` 12
`
σ˝
˘2 ż ż B2µXvpt, µYt qpy, ryqµYt pdyqµYt pdryq
` θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ż BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx,d`q ` 12`σ˝˘2
ż
BxBµXvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q
` 12hpµ
Y
t , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, ζq
˙
dt
` σ˝
ż `´ BµXvpt, µYt qpx, `q ` BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `q`Zt ` Zµt ˘˘µYt pdx, d`qdWt˝ .
By assumption, v is solution to the HJB (4.2):
0 “ Btvpt, µYt q ` 12
`
σ˝
˘2 ż ż B2µXvpt, µYt q`x, `, rx, r`˘ µYt pdx, d`qµYt pdrx,dr`q ` ż BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qpg ´ fqpxqµYt pdx,d`q
` θ2
`
σ˝
˘2 ż BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q ` 12`σ˝˘2
ż
BxBµXvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q
` 12 supvPR3 hpµ
Y
t , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, vq,
therefore we obtain
vpT, µYT q “ vp0, µY0 q ` 12
ż T
0
´
hpµYt , Bµv, ByBµv, B2µv, ζq ´ sup
ζPR3
hpµYt , Bµv, ByBµv, B2µv, vq
¯
dt
` σ˝
ż T
0
ż `´ BµXvpt, µYt qpx, `q ` BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `q`Zt ` Zµt ˘˘µYt pdx, d`qdWt˝
Under Assumption (4.4) on the partial derivatives of v, the process
σ˝
ż ¨
0
ż `´ BµXvpt, µYt qpx, `q ` BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `q`Zt ` Zµt ˘˘µYt pdx, d`qdWt˝ .
is a P´martingale, since the following quantities
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ ż t
0
ż
BµXvps, µYs qpx, `qµYs pdx, d`qdWs˝
ˇˇˇˇ
loooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
“:A
, and EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ ż t
0
ż
BµLvps, µYs qpx, `q
`
Zs ` Zµs
˘
µYs pdx,d`qdWs˝
ˇˇˇˇ
looooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
“:B
,
are finite. Indeed, on the one hand, using Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality, we have for some constant C ą 0,
independent of P,
A ď CEP
„ˆż T
0
ˆż
BµXvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q
˙2
ds
˙1{2
ă `8,
by the first part of Assumption (4.4). On the other hand, using in addition Hölder’s inequality, we have, for some
constant rC ą 0 independent of P, and for p1 ą 1 given by Lemma A.4
B ď rCEP„ˆż T
0
ˆż
BµLvps, µYs qpx, `q
`
Zs ` Zµs
˘
µYs pdx,d`q
˙2
ds
˙1{2
ď 2 rCEP„ sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ ż
BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q
ˇˇˇˇˆ ż T
0
`
Z2s ` pZµs q2
˘
ds
˙1{2
ď 2 rCˆEP„ sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇˇˇ ż
BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q
ˇˇˇˇ p1
p1´1
˙1´ 1
p1
ˆ
EP
„ˆż T
0
`
Z2s ` pZµs q2
˘
ds
˙p1{2˙ 1
p1 ă `8,
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Indeed, the first term is finite by the second part of Assumption (4.4), and the second term is also finite since ζ P V
implies that Z and Zµ are in Hp1 by Lemma A.4. Therefore we obtain
EPrvpT, µYT qs “ vp0, µY0 q `
ż T
0
EP
”
hpµYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, ζtq
´ sup
vPR3
θpµYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, vq
ı
dt.
Using the terminal condition vP pT, µYT q “ UP
´
´ EµLT
”
LζT
ı¯
and noticing that for all t P r0, T s,
hpµYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, ζtq ´ sup
vPR3
θpµYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, vq ď 0,
with equality for ζ‹t :“ v‹pt, µYt q by assumption, which leads to
EP
”
UP
´
´ EµLT
”
LζT
ı¯ı
ď vp0, µY0 q,
with equality for ζ‹. Therefore, vp0, µY0 q “ V P .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Let u be a solution to the PDE (4.6), smooth enough in the sense of Definition 4.3; satisfying Condition (4.8). Let
ζ
‹ “ pZ‹, Zµ,‹,Γ‹q be a process in V such that for all t P r0, T s, ζ‹t :“ v‹
`
t, µXt
˘
is the maximiser of hP defined by
(4.9). We define the function v as:
vpt, µYt q “ ´eRP
`
Eµ
L
t
“
Lζ
‹
t
‰
´upt,µXt q
˘
.
To prove the first point of the proposition, it is sufficient to show that the function v satisfies the assumptions of
Theorem 4.5. Indeed, we will have, by the first point of the theorem,
´eRP pξ0´up0,µX0 qq “ vp0, µY0 q “ V P0 .
First of all, v has the same regularity as u, and is therefore smooth enough in the sense of Definition 4.3. Moreover,
we can prove that v satisfies the condition (4.4). Indeed, sinceż
BµXvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q “ ´RP vpt, µYt quµX
`
t, µXt
˘
and
ż
BµLvpt, µYt qpx, `qµYt pdx, d`q “ RP vpt, µYt q,
Condition (4.4) is equivalent here to
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘
vpt, µYt q
ˇˇ2dt˙1{2` EP„ sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇ
vpt, µYt q
ˇˇp1{pp1´1q ă `8.
By applying Hölder’s inequality twice, we have the following upper bound for the first expectationˆ
EP
„ˆż T
0
ˇˇ
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘ˇˇ2dt˙p1{2˙1{p1ˆEP„ sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇ
vpt, µYt q
ˇˇp1{pp1´1q˙1´1{p1
,
where the first expectation is finite since u satisfies Condition (4.8). It remains to prove that the second one is finite.
By applying Hölder’s inequality,
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
ˇˇ
vpt, µYt q
ˇˇp1{pp1´1q “ EP„ sup
0ďtďT
e
p1RP
p1´1
`
Eµ
L
t
“
Lζ
‹
t
‰
´upt,µXt q
˘
ď
ˆ
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
e
εp1RP
p1´1 E
µL
t
“
Lζ
‹
t
‰˙1{εˆ
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
e´
q1p1RP
p1´1 upt,µXt qdt
˙1{q1
,
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for q1 “ ε{pε´1q and recalling that ε “appp1 ´ 1q{p1. Thus, the second expectation if finite since u satisfies Condition
(4.8). Moreover, since xXy is bounded and applying again Holder’s inequality with ε and q1, there exists some positive
constant C such that the first expectation has the following upper bound
C
ˆ
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
e
ε2p1RP
p1´1 E
P
“
ξζ
‹
t
ˇˇ
F˝t
‰˙ 1
ε2
ˆ
EP
„
sup
0ďtďT
e
pRP
ε´1 E
P
“ şt
0 gpXsqds
ˇˇ
F˝t
‰˙ 1
ε´1
.
By noting that ε
2p1
p1´1 “ p, we deduce from (4.7) that the first term is finite. Since g has linear growth and X has
bounded drift and volatility, the second term is also finite.
To apply Theorem 4.5, it remains to prove that v is a solution to the PDE (4.2) and that ζ‹ satisfies the optimality
condition on h. By computing the partial derivatives of v in term of u, the function h in the PDE (4.2) can be rewritten
as:
hpµt, Bµv, ByBµv, B2µv, vq “ RP v
´
Σ‹pγq`θ `RAz2 ´ ux,µX ˘` c‹βpγq ` c‹αpzq ` 2ρ`z´ ^Amax˘uµX
` `σ˝˘2pRA `RP q`z ` zµ˘2 ´ 2RP `σ˝˘2`z ` zµ˘uµX¯.
Noticing that v ă 0,
sup
vPR3
hpµYt , Bµvpt, µYt q, ByBµvpt, µYt q, B2µvpt, µYt q, vq “ RP vpt, µYt q inf
vPR3
hP pµXt , uµX
`
t, µXt
˘
, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘
, vq,
with hP defined by (4.9). Since the infimum of hP on zµ is attained in
zµ,‹
`
t, µXt
˘ “ ´z ` RP
RA `RP uµX
`
t, µXt
˘
,
point piiiq of the proposition has been proven and point pvq is an easy computation for simple contracts in Definition
3.1 with the optimal payment rate Zµ,‹t “ zµ,‹
`
t, µXt
˘
. Moreover, we obtain
inf
vPR3
hP pµXt , uµX , ux,µX , vq “ ´
`
σ˝
˘2 R2P
RA `RP
`
uµX
˘2 ´ ρ`uµX ˘2 ` inf
zPR
!
F0pqpz, ux,µX qq ` ρ
`pz´ ^Amaxq ` uµX ˘2).
Therefore, the function v is solution to the PDE (4.2) if
0 “ RP v
ˆ
´ Btu
`
t, µXt
˘` ż pg ´ fqpxqµXt pdxq ` θ2`σ˝˘2 ` 12
ˆ`
σ˝
˘2
R´ ρ
˙`
uµX
`
t, µXt
˘˘2
´ 12
`
σ˝
˘2`
ux,µX ` uµX ,µX
˘`
t, µXt
˘` 12 infzPR!F0`q`z, ux,µX `t, µXt ˘˘˘` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` uµX `t, µXt ˘˘2)
˙
,
and this equality is true since u is solution to the PDE (4.6).
Consider now the following minimisation problem:
inf
zPR
!
F0
`
q
`
z, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘˘˘` ρ`pz´ ^Amaxq ` uµX `t, µXt ˘˘2). (A.8)
By [1, Lemma 4.1], the function F0 is non-decreasing, the infimum is reached for γ‹ “ ´q, which proves the point pivq
of the Proposition, and we have
F0pqq “ qΣ‹p´qq ` c‹βp´qq “
dÿ
k“1
`
σk
˘2
λk
„
λk1λkqď1 ` 1ηk
ˆ`
1` ηk˘`λkq˘ ηk1`ηk ´ 1˙1λkqą1.
For z ě 0, the minimisation problem (A.8) is equal to ρ`uµX `t, µXt ˘˘2 ` infzě0  F0`q`z, ux,µX `t, µXt ˘˘˘(, and since F0
is non-decreasing, its minimum is attained on the minimum of q
`
z, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘˘
, for z “ 0. Therefore, (A.8) is equal
to ρ
`
uPµX
`
t, µXt
˘˘2 ` F0`θ ´ ux,µX `t, µXt ˘˘.
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On the other hand, for z ď 0, the minimisation problem (A.8) is equal to
inf
zď0
!
F0
`
q
`
z, ux,µX
`
t, µXt
˘˘˘` ρ`p´z ^Amaxq ` uµX `t, µXt ˘˘2),
then, if uµX
`
t, µXt
˘ ě 0, the infimum is reached on z “ 0. Otherwise, the infimum lie between uµX `t, µXt ˘ _ ´Amax
and 0.
To sum up, the optimal process Z‹ is defined for t P r0, T s by Z‹t “ z‹
`
t, µXt
˘
which is the minimiser z‹ of (A.8) and
satisfies
z‹
`
t, µXt
˘ “ 0, when uµX `t, µXt ˘ ě 0, and z‹`t, µXt ˘ P “uµX `t, µXt ˘_´Amax, 0‰ when uµX `t, µXt ˘ ď 0,
thus the point piiq has been proven.
To conclude the proof, it is sufficient to notice that ζ‹ defined by the triple pZ‹, Zµ,‹,Γ‹q satisfies the optimality
condition and apply the Theorem 4.5 to the function v.
B Reservation utility of the consumer
The contract ξ offered by the Principal has to satisfy the participation constraint V Apξq ě R0, where R0 is defined as
the expected utility of the consumer without contract:
R0 :“ sup
PPP
EP
„
´ exp
ˆ
´RA
ż T
0
`
fpXsq ´ c
`
νPs
˘˘
ds
˙
.
The underlying idea is that consumers will refuse the contract if it provides them with a utility level which is lower than
the one they could attain by themselves without any contract. The corresponding value can then be obtained through
a standard HJB PDE, which we can solve explicitly when the function f is linear. Apart from the terms depending on
the common noise, the same results as in [1] are obtained.
Proposition B.1 (Consumer’s reservation utility). Assume that f has linear growth. Then the following holds.
piq The consumer’s reservation utility is given by R0 “ ´e´RAψp0,X0q, where the corresponding certainty equivalent
ψ is a solution pin the viscosity senseq of the HJB equation$&%0 “ Btψpt, xq ` fpxq ´
1
2
´
c‹βpγ0pt, xqq ´ γ0pt, xqΣ‹pγ0pt, xqq ´ γ0pt, xq
`
σ˝
˘2¯
, pt, xq P r0, T q ˆ R,
ψpT, xq “ 0, x P R,
(B.1)
where γ0 :“ B2xxψ ´RApBxψq2.
piiq Assume that PDE (B.1) has a C1,2 solution ψ such that for any P P P the following condition is satisfied
EP
„ ż T
0
e´2RAψpt,Xtq
`Bxψpt,Xtq˘2dt ă `8. (B.2)
Define the feedback control
α0t :“ 0 and β0,kt :“ bk,‹
`
γ0pt,Xtq
˘
, k “ 1, . . . , d, t P r0, T s. (B.3)
Then, an optimal effort of the consumer is defined by the feedback control (B.3).
Proof. piq Since the function f is non–decreasing, the consumer has no reason to make an effort on the drift of his
consumption deviation, as no compensation is offered for this costly effort. More rigorously, the comparison theorem
for SDEs with the same diffusion coefficient, see for instance [32, Corollary 3.1], as well as the fact that f is non–
decreasing imply immediately that the supremum in the definition of R0 can only be attained for efforts of the form
νP “ p0.βPq P U. Notice however that, due to his risk aversion, he might have interest to make effort on the volatility.
Denoting by Rpt,Xtq the dynamic version of the reservation utility, satisfying
Rp0, X0q “ R0 and RpT,XT q “ ´1;
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and using standard stochastic control theory, we obtain the following HJB equation for the function R:
0 “ BtRpt, xq ´RARpt, xqfpxq ` 12
`
σ˝
˘2B2xxRpt, xq ` 12 supbPB  Rpt, xqRAcβpbq ` B2xxRpt, xqΣpbq(.
The optimal effort on the volatility without contract is thus bk,‹pγ0q where
γ0pt, xq :“ ´B
2
xxRpt, xq
Rpt, xqRA .
Using the same notations as in the previous subsection, we obtain
0 “ BtRpt, xq ´RARpt, xqfpxq ` 12Rpt, xqRA
´
c‹βpγ0pt, xqq ´ γ0pt, xqΣ‹pγ0pt, xqq ´ γ0pt, xq
`
σ˝
˘2¯
.
The solution to the previous PDE is non–positive and can thus be written under the form Rpt, xq “ ´e´RAψpt,xq where
the function ψ is the certainty equivalent function, satisfying the PDE (B.1).
piiq Let ψ be a C1,2´solution to the PDE (B.1). We then can apply Ito¯’s formula to the function R0pt, xq :“ ´e´RAψpt,xq
under an arbitrary P P P
dR0ps,Xsq “ BtR0ps,Xsqds´ αPs ¨ 1dBxR0ps,Xsqds` BxR0ps,Xsq
`
σpβPs q ¨ dWs ` σ˝dWs˝
˘
` 12B
2
xxR0ps,Xsq
`
ΣpβPs q `
`
σ˝
˘2˘ds.
Denoting by
`
MPt
˘
tě0 the process M
P
t “ eRA
şt
0p 12 cβpβPsq´fpXsqqdsR0pt,Xtq, t P r0, T s, we obtain, again by Ito¯’s formula
MPt “MP0 `
ż t
0
eRA
şs
0p 12 cβpβPuq´fpXuqqdu
ˆ
BtR0ps,Xsq ´ αPs ¨ 1dBxR0ps,Xsq ` 12B
2
xxR0ps,Xsq
`
ΣpβPs q `
`
σ˝
˘2˘˙ds
`
ż t
0
MPsRApcpνPs q ´ fpXsqqds`
ż t
0
eRA
şT
0 p 12 cβpβPsq´fpXsqqdsBxR0ps,Xsq
`
σpβPs q ¨ dWs ` σ˝dWs˝
˘
.
Replacing by the derivatives of ψ, we obtain
MPt “MP0 `
ż t
0
RAM
P
s h
ψpXs, Bxψ, B2xxψ, αPs , βPs qds´
ż t
0
RAM
P
s Bxψ
`
σpβsq ¨ dWs ` σ˝dWs˝
˘
,
where hψpx, Bxψ, B2xxψ, a, bq “ ´Btψ ` cpνsq ´ fpxq ` a ¨ 1dBxψ ` 12
`
RA
`Bxψ˘2 ´ B2xxψ˘`Σpbq ` `σ˝˘2˘.
Under Condition (B.2), the term
şt
0RAM
P
s Bxψ
`
σpβPs q ¨ dWs ` σ˝dWs˝
˘
, is a P´martingale. Indeed, recall that under
any P P P, the drift and the volatility of X are bounded, cβ and Σ are continuous functions on the compact set B, and
f has linear growth. Hence, using in particular Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, (B.2) ensures that the above stochastic
integral is in H1pPq and is thus a P´martingale. We deduce
EPrMPT s “MP0 ` EP
„ ż t
0
RAM
P
s h
ψpXs, Bxψ, B2xxψ, αPs , βPs qds

.
Using the boundary condition for ψ, and replacing by their respective values of MP0 and MPT , we obtain
R0p0, X0q “ EP
”
´ eRA
şT
0 p 12 cβpβPsq´fpXsqqds
ı
´ EP
„ ż t
0
RAM
P
s h
ψpXs, Bxψ, B2xxψ, αPs , βPs qds

.
Using the HJB satisfied by ψ, we have
hψpx, Bxψ, B2xxψ, a, bq “ 12
`
cαpaq ` 2a ¨ 1dBxψ
˘` 12`cβpbq ´ γ0Σpbq˘´ 12c‹βpγ0q ` 12γ0Σ‹pγ0q,
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and by simple computations
cβpbq ´ γ0t Σpbq ě inf
b1PB
 
cβpb1q ´ γ0Σpb1q
( “ ´Hv`γ0˘ “ ´γ0Σ‹`γ0˘` c‹βpγ0q,
cαpaq ` 2a ¨ 1dBxψ ě inf
a1PA
 
cαpa1q ` 2a1 ¨ 1dBxψ
( “ ´HdpBxψq “ 0,
since the function Bxψ is non–negative. Therefore, hψpx, Bxψ, B2xxψ, a, bq ě 0, with equality for the optimal controls
pα0, β0q defined by (B.3), which leads to R0p0, X0q ě EP
”
´ eRA şT0 p 12 cβpβPsq´fpXsqqdsı, with equality for the optimal
controls.
The previous result shows that, even without contracting, the consumer’s optimal behaviour exhibits a positive effort to
reduce the volatility of the consumption deviation process. Of course, this is naturally due to the fact that consumers
in our model are assumed to be risk–averse, and are therefore negatively impacted by the variance of their deviation.
We conclude this section by providing a closed–form expression for the reservation utility when f is linear.
Proposition B.2 (f linear). Let fpxq “ κx, x P R, with κ ě 0. Then, the reservation utility of the consumer is
R0 “ ´e´RApκTX0`ψ0pT qq, where ψ0pT q :“ ´
ż T
0
H0pγ0ptqqdt,
γ0ptq “ ´RAκ2pT ´ tq2, and H0pγq :“ 12
´
c‹βpγq ´ γΣ‹pγq ´ γ
`
σ˝
˘2¯
.
The consumer’s optimal effort on the drift and on each volatility usage are respectively:
α0 :“ 0 and β0,kt :“ 1^
`
λkRAκ
2pT ´ tq2˘ ´1ηk`1 _Bmin, k “ 1, . . . , d.
thus inducing an optimal distribution P0 under which the deviation process follows the dynamics
dXt “ σ‹
`
γ0ptq˘ ¨ dWt ` σ˝dWt˝ .
Proof. By directly plugging the guess ψpt, xq “ Aptqx` ψ0ptq in the PDE (B.1), we obtain
0 “ A1ptqx` ψ10ptq ` κx´ 12
´
c‹βp´RAA2ptqq `RAA2ptqΣ‹p´RAA2ptqq `RAA2ptq
`
σ˝
˘2¯
, ApT q “ ψ0pT q “ 0.
This provides Aptq “ κpT ´ tq and ψ0ptq “ ´
şT
t
H0
`´RAA2psq˘ds with H0pγq :“ 12´c‹βpγq ´ γΣ‹pγq ´ γ`σ˝˘2¯.
Finally the expression of the maximiser β0,k follows from Proposition B.1. Moreover, this smooth solution to the PDE
satisfies the condition (B.2). Indeed, this condition is equivalent to having, for any P P P
EP
„ ż T
0
e´2RApκpT´tqXt`ψ0ptqqpT ´ tq2dt

ă `8,
which is true since X is an Ito¯ process with bounded drift and volatility. We thus conclude with Proposition B.1 piiq
that it is indeed the value function inducing the reservation utility.
Remark B.3. One can notice that the certainty equivalent ψ is a decreasing function of the correlation σ˝ with the
common noise, since
ψpt, xq “ κxpT ´ tq ´ 12
ż T
t
´
c‹p´RAA2psqq `RAA2psqΣ‹p´RAA2psqq
¯
ds´ 12RA
`
σ˝
˘2 ż T
t
A2psqds.
Therefore, the reservation utility of the consumer is negatively impacted by the presence of common noise.
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C Details and proof for the first–best case
Adapting the reasoning in [17], we are led to introduce a slight modification of the so–called Morse–Transue space on
the initial canonical space Ω, defined here for any P P P by
MPpRq :“  ϑ : Ω ÝÑ R, measurable, EPrφpaϑqs ă `8, for all a ě 0(,
where φ : R ÝÑ R is the following Young function φ : x ÞÝÑ expp|x|q ´ 1. Then, MPpRq endowed with the norm
}ϑ}φ :“ inf
 
k ą 0 : EPrφpϑ{kqs ď 1( is a Banach space. In this case, the set of admissible contracts ΞFB is defined as
ΞFB :“  ξ PMPpRq : FT ´measurable, such that EPrξ|FT˝ s PMPpRq, @ P P P(. (C.1)
Thus, for any pξ, µX ,Pq P ΞFB ˆ PT pRq ˆ P, the quantities JA0 pξ, µX ,Pq and JP0 pξ,Pq are well–defined. Given the
reservation utility level of the representative Agent, R0, the problem of the Principal is
V FB0 :“ inf
ρą0
"
´ ρR0 ` sup
pP,µXqPPˆPT pRq
sup
ξPΞFB
 
JP0 pξ,Pq ` ρJA0 pξ, µX ,Pq
(*
,
where ρ ą 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the participation constraint. We first maximise this utility with
respect to ξ. Let us consider, for any probability pP, µXq P P ˆ PT pRq, the following map ΞP : ΞFB ÝÑ R defined by
ΞPpξq :“ EP
„
UP
ˆ
´ EP
„
ξ `
ż T
0
gpXsqds` θ2
ż T
0
dxXys
ˇˇˇˇ
FT˝
˙
` ρUA
ˆ
ξ ´
ż T
0
`
c
`
νPs
˘´ f`Xs˘˘ds˙.
Recall that the representative Agent is risk–averse, with a risk–aversion parameter RA. We can consider both the cases
of a risk–averse or risk–neutral Principal. To simplify the notations, we define
KPT :“
ż T
0
gpXsqds` θ2
ż T
0
dxXys, KA,PT :“
ż T
0
`
c
`
νPs
˘´ f`Xs˘˘ds and KT :“ KA,PT `KPT . (C.2)
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 6.1 by considering a CARA risk averse principal since the risk-neutral principal
case is deduced by taking RP “ 0.
If the Principal is risk averse, the utility of the Principal is defined as UP pxq “ ´e´RP x. Thus we obtain
ΞPpξq :“ EP“´ exp `RPEP“ξ `KPT ˇˇFT˝ ‰˘´ ρ exp `´RAξ `RAKA,PT ˘‰.
For any ϑ P ΞFB and ε ě 0,
1
ε
`
ΞPpξ ` εϑq ´ ΞPpξq˘ “ 1
ε
EP
“´ exp `RPEP“ξ ` εϑ`KPT ˇˇFT˝ ‰˘` exp `RPEP“ξ `KPT ˇˇFT˝ ‰˘‰
` 1
ε
EP
“´ ρ exp `´RA`ξ ` εϑ˘`RAKA,PT ˘` ρ exp `´RAξ `RAKA,PT ˘‰
“ 1
ε
EP
”
eRPE
Prξ`KPT |F˝T s`1´ eRP εEPrϑ|F˝T s˘ı` 1
ε
EP
”
ρe´RAξ`RAK
A,P
T
`
1´ e´RAεϑ˘ı.
Therefore, letting εÑ 0, the Gâteaux derivative is given by
DΞPpξqrϑs “ EP
”
´RPEPrϑ|FT˝ seRPE
Prξ`KPT |F˝T s ` ρϑRAe´RAξ`RAKA,PT
ı
“ EP
”
EP
“´RPϑeRPEPrξ`KPT |F˝T s ˇˇFT˝ ‰` ρϑRAe´RAξ`RAKA,PT ı
Conditioning by FT˝ , we obtain:
DΞPpξqrϑs “ EP
”
EP
“´RPϑeRPEPrξ`KPT |F˝T s ˇˇFT˝ ‰` EP“ρhRAe´RAξ`RAKA,PT ˇˇFT˝ ‰ı
“ EP
”
´RPϑeRPEPrξ`KPT |F˝T s ` ρϑRAe´RAξ`RAKA,PT
ı
.
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For any P P P, let us introduce ξ‹pPq defined by
ξ‹pPq “ ´ 1
RA `RP ln
ˆ
RP
ρRA
˙
`KAT ´ RPRA `RP E
PrKT |FT˝ s. (C.3)
so that
EPrξ‹pPq|FT˝ s :“ ´ 1RA `RP ln
ˆ
RP
ρRA
˙
` RA
RA `RP E
PrKAT |FT˝ s ´ RPRA `RP E
PrKPT |FT˝ s,
and
ξ‹pPq :“ ´ 1
RA
ln
ˆ
RP
ρRA
˙
`KAT ´ RPRA
`
EPrξ‹pPq|FT˝ s ` EPrKPT |FT˝ s
˘
.
Then, for any ϑ P ΞFB, we have DΞP`ξ‹pPq˘rϑs “ 0 and ΞP is strictly concave function, so that this ξ‹pPq attains the
minimum of ΞP and is therefore optimal. Plugging these expressions back into the Principal and recalling that R is
defined by 1{R :“ 1{RA ` 1{RP , the value function of the Principal in the first best case rewrites:
V FB0 “ inf
ρą0
"
ρ
ˆ
´R0 ` RA `RP
RP
exp
ˆ
RA
RA `RP ln
ˆ
RP
ρRA
˙˙
V R0
˙*
, where V R0 :“ sup
PPP
EP
„
´ exp `R EP“KT ˇˇFT˝ ‰˘.
Notice that V R0 does not depend on ρ. Then direct calculations lead to the optimal Lagrange multiplier and first–best
value function:
ρ‹ “ RP
RA
ˆ
V R0
R0
˙1`RPRA
and V FB0 “ R0
ˆ
V R0
R0
˙1`RPRA
.
Using the same tools as in Section 4, we can easily prove the points piq, piiq and pivq of Proposition 6.1. The point piiiq
is a straightforward computation of the contract defined by (C.3).
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